A SCOUT WITH CUSTER: EDMUND GUERRIER ON THE HANCOCK EXPEDITION OF 1867

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SETTLERS, overland travelers, and railroad construction crews in post-Civil War Kansas were becoming increasingly uneasy due to numerous Indian raids. The Cheyenne, Sioux, Arapaho, and Kiowa warriors had become so defiant in the early months of 1867 that they informed certain army officers that as soon as spring came travel on the various overland routes must cease.

Although the Indian agents insisted that the Kansans were overreacting to the situation, Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, commander of the Department of the Missouri, decided to do something about the alarming situation. He informed the various Indian agents that he was organizing an expedition in order to convince the tribes that he was, "able to punish any of them who molest travelers across the plains, or who commit other hostilities against the whites." Hancock hoped that a simple show of force would be enough to persuade the hostiles that a war against the whites would eventually lead to their extermination. He therefore assembled 1,400 men for the campaign, including portions of Bvt. Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith's newly formed Seventh cavalry under Bvt. Maj. Gen. George Armstrong Custer. Hancock also realized that if the campaign was to be successful, he needed a reliable group of scouts, interpreters, and dispatch riders. When he and his troops reached Fort Larned on April 7, the general asked the Cheyenne agent, Edward W. Wynkoop, to supply him with a scout. Wynkoop suggested that he talk with Edmund Guerrier, a local trader. At first Guerrier declined Hancock's offer to become a scout, but later reconsidered. The general ordered the quartermaster to place Guerrier's name on the payroll at a rate of $100 per month.

Hancock did not check into Guerrier's personal background in order to determine his suitability for the position of scout. On the frontier resumés were unnecessary. The only qualifications a scout needed to possess were outlined by George Custer in the following manner: "Do you know the country thoroughly? and can you speak any of the Indian languages? constitute the only examination which civil or uncivil service reform demands on the Plains." Guerrier certainly fulfilled these requirements.

EDMUND GASSEAU CHOTEAU GUERRIER was born January 16, 1840, in a Cheyenne Indian village located on the Smoky Hill river in central Kansas. His father, William Guerrier, was a French trader who worked out of Fort Laramie with his partner Seth Ward. Edmund's mother was Tah-tah-tois-neh, a full-blooded Cheyenne. The half-breed's early life was spent with his mother's people. In 1849 Tah-tah-tois-neh died of cholera and Edmund went to live at Fort Laramie with his father. William Guerrier intended that his son receive a better than average education and, in 1856, sent him to St. Louis University in Missouri. Edmund was forced to withdraw the following year, however, when his father was accidentally killed while trading in Wyoming.

The half-breed spent the next several years

2. The post-Civil War United States was divided into various military divisions. Each division was in turn broken into several departments with a commanding officer for each area. The Department of the Missouri was located within the Military Division of the Missouri. Gen. William T. Sherman was the divisional commandant.
roaming throughout the West occupying various jobs from bullwhacking to horseherding. He eventually ended up back with his mother’s people and was present in the Indian camp during the infamous Sand Creek massacre. Fortunately, Guerrier managed to escape along with his friend, George Bent. In the spring of 1867 Guerrier was working for the trading firm of D. A. Butterfield on Pawnee fork when he accepted Hancock’s offer to become a scout.7

Guerrier’s first assignment was to ride out and bring in a band of Cheyennes to counsel with Hancock. These same Indians had promised Agent Wynkoop that they would meet with Hancock on April 10, but a snowstorm delayed their arrival and the conference was rescheduled for the following day. The Indians still did not appear and finally, on the 12th, Hancock decided to march his troops to the Cheyenne village. That afternoon however, Guerrier rode in with a party of 15 Indians, including chiefs White Horse, Tall Bull, and Bull Bear.8

Hancock was dissatisfied because so few Indians had appeared. In a council that evening he told Tall Bull and the other chiefs that he intended to march to their village the following morning in order to talk with all the Indian leaders. Naturally, the chiefs became intensely alarmed over this proposition. Chivington’s raid on Sand Creek was still very fresh in their minds. After the conference ended, Tall Bull explained to Agent Wynkoop that Hancock would only frighten away his people if the troops came too close to the village. Wynkoop gave the general this information but Hancock could not be dissuaded. Guerrier backed up the agent by saying that the Indians did not believe that Hancock’s intentions were peaceful because he had brought along so many troops.9

The next morning the expedition, led by Guerrier and a group of Delaware scouts,

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Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock (1824-1886), commander of the Department of the Missouri, organized an expedition in 1867 to convince the hostile Indians that he was able to punish any who might molest travelers or commit hostilities against the whites on the Plains. Indian raiding increased in western Kansas after Hancock burned a Cheyenne village at Pawnee fork. The sketch of the burning village, above, is from Harper's Weekly, June 8, 1867. The drawing of the Indian attack on the stagecoach, left, appeared in Harper's New Monthly Magazine, July, 1867.
Reliable scouts, interpreters, and dispatch riders were essential to a successful campaign. When Hancock arrived at Fort Larned, he asked the Indian agent, Edward W. Wynkoop (1836-1891), to supply him with a scout. Wynkoop recommended Guerrier, who at first declined, but later accepted the job which paid $100 a month. Above left is a photograph of Guerrier reproduced courtesy of Kent Ruth, Geary, Okla. A sketch of Wynkoop with his interpreter, Theodore R. "Dick" Curtis, above right, is reproduced from Harper’s Weekly, May 11, 1867. The drawing of Fort Larned is from Harper’s Weekly, June 8, 1867.
This map shows the route of Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock's march from Fort Larned to the Indian village at Pawnee fork, and the pursuit of the Indians who escaped from the village by Bvt. Maj. Gen. George A. Custer. Present day towns and the boundaries of Ness county are included so that the routes of Hancock, Custer, and the fleeing Indians can be seen in relation to landmarks of today. Map reproduced courtesy of Minnie Dubbs Millbrooke, Topeka.

started out for the village which was located on Pawnee fork. The troops were also accompanied by a contingent of white scouts and couriers including James B. "Wild Bill" Hickok, Thomas Kincade, and Thomas Atkins. While enroute the column was met by Sioux leader Pawnee Killer and several other tribal chiefs. These Indians accepted Hancock's invitation to spend the evening with his command, and camp was made about 21 miles from Fort Larned.

At 9:00 the next morning Pawnee Killer left camp, promising Hancock that he would return with the other chiefs from the village. The general waited until 11:00 a.m. but when the chiefs did not arrive, he resumed the march. When the command reached a point several miles from the Indian camp, it was suddenly confronted by a large body of Cheyenne and Sioux warriors painted for war. Hancock brought Custer's cavalry into line and it appeared as if a battle were imminent. Edmund Guerrier, along with Agent Wynkoop, rode out to speak with the famous Cheyenne war leader Roman Nose. Guerrier had nothing to fear from the Indians for they were well acquainted with the scout and considered him a close and trusted friend. As a matter of fact, Roman Nose was married to Guerrier's cousin. Wynkoop convinced the chiefs to approach the troops and parley with Hancock. 10

The leaders of both sides met midway between the opposing lines. Hancock, accompanied by Custer and other members of his staff, asked Roman Nose if he had come prepared for war or peace. Roman Nose arrogantly replied that if he had come for war, his warriors would not have ridden so close to the "big guns," referring to the artillery battery. The conference ended when Hancock said that it was too windy to talk on the open prairie and invited the Indians to his camp for a meeting that

10. Ibid.
two fresh horses. He also asked Guerrier to go with the Indians and remain in the village. The scout was further ordered to report back to the general every two hours as to the state of affairs in the Indian encampment. At 7:00 p.m. the conference broke up and the chiefs, accompanied by Guerrier, returned to their camp. 12

During the conference Roman Nose decided to kill Hancock whom he considered his worst enemy. Bull Bear kept pulling Guerrier aside so that he would not be harmed. Hancock, however, kept the half-breed close to his side by hanging onto his sleeve. Years later Guerrier told an interviewer, "I never knew whether Hancock suspected trouble or whether he pulled me back to his side just to be contrary to Bull Bear, who had pulled me away." Finally Roman Nose gave up the idea of assassinating the general and the chiefs left camp. 13

Upon arriving at the village, Guerrier noticed that the Sioux had already vacated their lodges and were nowhere to be found. The scout was escorted into a tepee where he told the chiefs that he would be held responsible if they left the camp without telling him. Guerrier recounted what happened next:

After a while Roman Nose came into the tepee where I was, after they had had a council and touching me on the shoulder said, 'My friend we are all going. So go and report that we are all going to leave the camp.' They gave back to me the two horses Hancock had given them and Bull Bear escorted me about halfway back to Hancock, who was camped less than a mile away. 14

Guerrier later told his brother-in-law, George Bent, that he did not hurry back to report to Hancock in order to give the Indians time to escape. Bent, in turn, informed his biographer, George E. Hyde, of the incident. Although Guerrier never publicly corroborated Bent's statements, it seems logical that he delayed his arrival because the Indian village was full of friends and relatives whom he did not want harmed. In Hancock's official report he mentions that the scout did not return until 9:30 p.m. Since Guerrier was to report every two hours, he was a half an hour late. The

11. H. of Rep., "Difficulties With Indian Tribes," p. 29; Custer, My Life on the Plains, pp. 33-35; [T. B. Davis] A Summer on the Plains, Harper's New Monthly Magazine, New York, v. 36 (February, 1868), p. 295. E. W. Wynkoop gave the distance between the two camps as "a few hundred yards," while Hancock stated that it was "within one-half mile." At any rate it was a comparatively short distance.


distance between the two camps was less than one mile and would not have taken over five minutes to ride. 15

When Guerrier finally did return, he told Hancock that the Indians were preparing to leave. The general summoned Custer and ordered him to mount his command and surround the village. Hancock did not become suspicious of Guerrier because he could hear Roman Nose chanting from the Indian camp. When the general asked Guerrier what the song meant, Dick Curtis, another interpreter, inaccurately stated that it was a song Indians sang when they were frightened. 16 It is possible that Roman Nose remained behind in order to convince Hancock that the Indians still occupied the village, thus covering up for Guerrier.

Within minutes the Seventh cavalry, along with Guerrier, was mounted and heading toward the Indian camp. Custer deployed his troops and quietly surrounded the village. He then dismounted and, along with some staff officers and Guerrier, approached the camp. Custer ordered the scout to call out to the village and inform any Indians who remained that their mission was friendly. There was no reply. The party then entered the camp and found it totally deserted with the exception of a half-breed girl and two old Sioux whom the Indians had left behind. 17

Custer returned to Hancock’s tent and reported to the general that all the Indians had escaped. The department commander ordered Custer to mount eight companies of the Seventh and attempt to overtake the fleeing Indians. He was further instructed not to attack the Indians if he caught up with them but to send Guerrier out to meet them and convince them to return to Pawnee fork. At dawn on April 15, the Seventh started out accompanied by Guerrier, “Wild Bill” Hickok, the courier Kincaid, and a party of Delaware scouts. Guerrier was the only scout who went with Custer who was thoroughly familiar with the country. Although the Delawares were experienced trail followers, they knew nothing of the region lying between the Arkansas and Smoky Hill rivers. 18

General Custer personally instructed Guerrier to ride ahead of the command and attempt to overtake the fleeing tribes. The scout was further ordered to tell any Indians he met that the troops would not attack them and that they should halt. Guerrier, however, did not believe this, thinking that Custer only wanted to trap the Cheyennes and take them all prisoners. While riding about three miles from the command, Guerrier saw a Cheyenne warrior who was recovering some ponies lost during the night. The scout signaled the brave to escape as fast as possible. 19 The Seventh cavalry pursued the Indians until about 5:00 p.m. when the trail became very faint. The Indians used the old

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18. Ibid., Custer, My Life on the Plains, pp. 44-46. The most comprehensive biography of “Wild Bill” Hickok, Joseph G. Rosa, They Called Him Wild Bill (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974), gives no indication that the plainsman had ever been in the area. Kincaid was sent with Custer to act as a courier, not a scout. Custer sent Kincaid back to Hancock with dispatches on April 16.
ploy of scattering in many directions in order to avoid pursuit.

Custer halted his command on Walnut creek and sent Kincade back to Pawnee fork with dispatches for Hancock. While the troops built fires and broke out mess gear, heavy smoke signals were observed in the northwestern sky. This was in the general direction of the Smoky Hill trail. At 4:00 the next morning the cavalry was saddled and headed toward the route. Custer began his march up Walnut creek but after traveling some distance the stream became dry because the command had passed its source. In order to obtain water for the thirsty horses, Custer was forced to backtrack nine miles to where the water still flowed. Naturally the troops lost valuable time and Custer probably conceded that his chances of overtaking the fleeing village were slim. In his official report, Custer did not blame anyone for the forced countermarch. General Hancock, however, rightly concluded that Custer was misled by one of his scouts. Hancock wrote:

It was unfortunate that the information in the possession of General Custer concerning the country in which he was operating, and his distance from the Smoky Hill, was not more accurate. As it was, he was misled by his guides, upon whom he was forced to depend, and induced to make a retrograde march of nine miles for water, losing many hours of valuable time thereby, when it was definitely ascertained afterward that, by keeping directly on, he would have reached the Smoky Hill about fifteen miles from the point at which he turned back—probably as soon as the Indians he was following...

It will be remembered that Edmund Guerrier was the only scout with the troops who had a thorough knowledge of the territory. It is also certain that Custer relied heavily on Guerrier during this phase of the campaign. Custer wrote, "The opinions of Guerrier [sic], the half-breed, were eagerly sought for and generally deferred to." Either Guerrier directly misguided the troops or simply feigned ignorance of the terrain allowing Custer to make the unnecessary countermarch on his own.

Custer decided to make up some of the lost time by a night march. In describing this maneuver Custer wrote:

It was determined to push on and reach the Smoky Hill route as soon as possible and give the numerous stage stations along that route notice of the presence of warlike Indians. This was before the Pacific Railroad or its

branches had crossed the Plains. Resting our animals from two until seven P.M., we were again in the saddle and setting out for a night march, our only guide being the North Star. We hoped to strike the stage route near a point called Downer's Station. After riding all night we reached and crossed about daylight the Smoky Hill River, along whose valley the stage route runs. The stations were then from ten to fifteen miles apart; if Indians had crossed this line at any point the station men would be informed of it. 24

The command reached Downer's Station on the afternoon of the 17th. The stage employees informed Custer that a band of Indians had attacked Lookout Station to the east, killing three station attendants there. Custer remained at the depot gathering information and resting the men and horses. The following morning the Seventh pushed on, arriving at Lookout in the afternoon. The general discovered the bodies of the murdered employees and assumed that the Indians who had committed the atrocities were the same ones that he was pursuing. 25

After burying the dead men, Custer pushed on toward Fort Hays. Along the way two heavy trails were seen leading north. Guerrier told Custer that the Cheyennes had rejoined the Sioux and were probably headed for the fork of the Solomon or perhaps Beaver creek. 24 Custer wanted to follow the trails but was forced to call off the chase until forage could be obtained from Hays. 25

When he arrived at the outpost the general was surprised to learn that no extra forage or supplies could be spared for his men or horses. Custer immediately sent Hickok on a fresh mule with a dispatch to Fort Harker in an attempt to gain forage there. He then asked Guerrier to go alone and locate the Indian's camp. If the scout found the village he was to return and lead Custer to it. The general hoped that by the time Guerrier returned he would have sufficient forage to continue the march. Guerrier was offered $100 extra to locate the camp and guide Custer back to it. 24 Guerrier's motivation in agreeing to Custer's proposition

22. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
23. H. of Rep., "Difficulties With Indian Tribes," pp. 69-70. Custer later stated that he did not believe that the Indians he was pursuing were responsible for the attack on Lookout because the affair took place on April 15. The time factor would have made it virtually impossible for the Cheyennes from Pawnee Fork to have reached Lookout and perpetrated the raid. The Sioux, however, under Pawnee Killer, left the village before the Cheyennes and could have reached the Smoky Hill station in time to commit the atrocities.
24. In Buckley, Custer, Come At Once!, p. 7, the author makes a good case in claiming that Guerrier was actually referring to Prairie Dog creek not Beaver creek.
26. Ibid., p. 70.

This sketch from Harper's Weekly, June 29, 1867, shows Custer's scouts, Comstock, Guerrier, Thomas Atkins, and Thomas Kincade. When Comstock, who was perhaps the best guide on the Kansas frontier at that time, joined the expedition, Guerrier probably realized that it would be virtually impossible to further sabotage the campaign.
The 1867 summer campaign came to an abrupt end in mid-July when Custer was placed under arrest for various indiscretions by his commanding officer, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith (1815-1897).

is unclear. He may have wanted another opportunity to mislead the troops, or possibly he thought that the Cheyennes were nowhere near the Sioux. George Bent, who was familiar with many of the Cheyennes who had fled from Pawnee fork, stated that many members of the tribe didn't even go to the north, but instead circled back south. If this were the case, Guerrier would not be endangering his kinsmen by taking Custer to the Sioux village.

The plan was finally scrapped when Custer learned that dispatches from Hancock were on the way. The general decided that it was best to first learn what Hancock wanted him to do. As it turned out, the dispatches contained orders instructing Custer to remain at Hays and reestablish the Smoky Hill stage route. 28

Custer remained idle at Fort Hays until May 3 when General Hancock arrived to inspect the post. Hancock ordered Custer to resume hunting the Indians as soon as supplies could be obtained.

Aside from sufficient forage and rations, Custer decided that another experienced guide was necessary if the campaign was to be successful. On April 25 Custer had written to Capt. Myles Keogh, commander at Fort Wallace, and requested that the post interpreter and scout William Averill Comstock report to him at Hays for service with the Seventh cavalry. 29 In requesting Comstock's services Custer may have recalled the unfortunate backtracking episode while pursuing the runaway Indians from Pawnee fork.

William "Medicine Bill" Comstock was perhaps the best guide on the Kansas frontier at that time. Custer wrote:

No Indian knew the country more thoroughly than did Comstock. He was perfectly familiar with every divide, watercourse, and strip of timber for hundreds of miles in either direction. He knew the dress and peculiarities of every Indian tribe, and spoke the language of many of them. 30

Harper's reporter Theodore Davis, who accompanied Custer's expedition as a correspondent, also had a high regard for "Medicine Bill's" capabilities. Davis wrote:

Will Comstock, the chief [of scouts], has lived in the Far West for many years, his qualifications as an interpreter and scout are said, by those best qualified to judge, to be unsurpassed by any white man on the plains. He is, moreover, a man of tried bravery and a first-rate shot. 31

Guerrier, who was still detached to the Seventh, probably realized that with Comstock along as chief scout it would be virtually impossible to further sabotage the campaign.

By June 1 everything was in readiness to continue the expedition against the hostsile. For the next month and a half the Seventh cavalry rode over 1,000 miles in an attempt to protect the area between the Smoky Hill and Platte rivers. Although the command was involved in several skirmishes with Indians, 29. George Bent to Myles W. Keogh, April 25, 1867, Records U.S. Army Mbl. Units, 7th. Cavalry Det., 1867-1869, "Letters Sent," National Archives.
31. Theodore R. Davis, "Custer's Scouts," Harper's Weekly, New York, v. 11 [June 25, 1867], p. 408. Davis also wrote about Guerrier in this article saying, "... Guerrier wears the clothes of the whites, speaks pure English, and has no confidence in the Indians. It appears Guerrier may have fooled Davis into thinking he was an Indian hater."
Custer was unable to bring the warring tribes to bay. The summer’s campaign came to an abrupt end in mid-July when Custer was placed under arrest by his commanding officer, Gen. Andrew J. Smith, for various indiscretions. Custer was later court-martialed and suspended from rank and pay for one year. 32

The Hancock expedition, and the summer campaign that followed, was a total failure. Instead of coaxing the Indians into submission by a large display of force, Hancock caused them to retaliate against white encroachment with a furor. The expenses incurred by the Department of the Missouri during the spring and summer of 1867 amounted to millions of dollars and prompted congress to demand some answers concerning such expenditures. 33 There is little question but that Guerrier’s activities had a definite effect on the unfortunate outcome of the campaign. At Pawnee fork it is certain that the army would have come to terms with the Indians, in one fashion or another, had not Guerrier allowed his kinsmen to escape undetected. The scout also used every means within his power to prevent Custer from catching up with the fleeing tribes. It is difficult to attach any blame to Guerrier’s actions since he likely was only trying to protect those people whom he considered friends and family.

Shortly after the conclusion of the summer operations, Hancock was replaced by Gen. Philip Sheridan. In the fall of 1868, Custer was recalled from suspension to lead a winter campaign against the hostile villages. The campaign was highly successful in that all of the tribes came into their reservations. Sporadic warfare was continued, however, by the malcontents of each tribe for another eight years. 34

Ed Guerrier continued to serve as a scout and interpreter for almost 10 years. 35 He finally settled on an allotment along the North Canadian river in present Oklahoma, near the Cheyenne-Arapaho agency. That Guerrier was never suspected of sabotaging the army expedition is evidenced by the fact that the citizens living near his ranch named their town after him. The founding fathers anglicized the French name, however, and today the town is known as Geary, Okla. Guerrier became a successful rancher and worked closely with the government and Cheyennes until his death in 1921. 36

32. A complete study of Custer’s actions, arrest, and subsequent court-martial can be found in Lawrence A. Frost, The Court-Martial of General George Armstrong Custer (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968). This volume contains the only verbatim proceedings of the trial in print.


