It is time that racial discrimination was ended,” opined an editorial writer for the University Daily Kansan in 1952. “It is time we ended it here at the University of Kansas.” Not everyone, of course, shared this view. Edwin F. Abels, the conservative editor of the Lawrence Outlook, was among the most vocal and intransigent critics of the civil rights movement, believing that “our ‘Do-Gooders’ . . . are suffering from ‘a rampage of sentimentality.’” A former state legislator prominent in local, state, and national affairs, Abels was a perennial critic of efforts to foist social change upon a resistant population. “They want to correct all the wrongs of the world . . . by a simple method, such as passing a law,” he complained in 1948. Prejudice, he believed, could only be eroded gradually, “like the weathering of a block of granite where the change made through a century is almost imperceptible.” He was also skeptical about the gravity of racism locally, reminding his audience in 1960 that black professionals had in the recent past called Lawrence home. Their current absence, he suggested, revealed more about black sloth than white prejudice. “Progress depends on the individual and his qualifications,” he maintained. “There is [now] no Negro lawyer in Lawrence and no amount of social legislation will bring one. There is no law, prejudice or anything else preventing a Negro from becoming a lawyer.” In a later meditation he added that Lawrence did not have a black doctor either. Yet, he noted, “Both the law school and . . . the school of medicine are, and have been, open to all who care to enter.”1

Brent M. S. Campney is assistant professor of history at the University of Texas-Pan American. He is currently preparing a manuscript on white supremacy and racist violence in Kansas between 1854 and 1920.

1. University Daily Kansan (University of Kansas, Lawrence), May 13, 1952; Lawrence Outlook, November 1, 1956; March 25, 1948; April 22, 1948; July 21, 1960; and January 12, 1961. On Edwin Abels, see Lawrence Daily Journal-World, April 22, 1985; Rusty L. Monhollon, “This is America?”. The Sixties in Lawrence, Kansas (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 30–32.
Abels reflected the views of white racial conservatives living in Lawrence and/or working at the University of Kansas (KU) in the years immediately following World War II. Repeatedly, they found themselves at loggerheads with civil rights activists who were conducting a spirited campaign to dismantle discrimination. Nonetheless, they undertook a vigorous defense of the status quo and enjoyed remarkable success in their efforts to “hold the line,” even though they were compelled to retreat on some issues. In addition to Abels, prominent conservatives included members of the “business oligarchy,” who not only owned the restaurants, theaters, and services targeted by civil rights activists, but exercised as well considerable political influence “since they control . . . all the city offices.” Less prominent conservatives—residents and students alike—articulated their views through their actions or through letters to the various local newspapers and to KU administrators.²

Historians have chronicled voluminously the civil rights movement that emerged after World War II and ultimately and profoundly transformed American society. Some have explored this movement within Kansas. Gretchen Cassel Eick, for instance, found that black activists led a vigorous assault against discrimination in Wichita from the 1950s through the 1970s. Both Kristine M. McCusker and Rusty L. Monhollon focused their studies on Lawrence. The former charted the growth of the civil rights movement from the start of World War II through the early 1960s; the latter examined the struggle for and against black equality during the 1960s.³ This study fills a remaining gap by examining the white resistance that developed against the movement in Lawrence between 1945 and 1961. Drawing on newspaper accounts and on the papers of university officials and of citizen and student activists, it identifies the conservatives who led this resistance, the arguments and tactics that they employed in pursuit of their objectives, and the consistency with which they pursued their cause throughout this relatively narrow window of time.⁴

After the Civil War, white Kansans created a “free-state” narrative that cast their state—and themselves—as staunchly committed to racial equality. Ignoring the fact that many territorial Kansas settlers opposed slavery to ensure an all-white state, they reframed the antislavery struggle as a romantic campaign for human liberty. Those in Lawrence, the territorial hotbed of abolitionism, subscribed to this narrative with particular fervor. “The ‘free-state’ narrative is an identity that the town always has embraced,” concluded Monhollon. “The narrative exerted a powerful influence on the town that to its nineteenth- and twentieth-century residents exemplified the triumph of good over evil, freedom over slavery, justice over inequity, and virtue over materialism.”⁵

Notwithstanding this narrative, many white Lawrencians never adhered to those high principles. In the aftermath of the Civil War, they imposed practices aimed at keeping blacks at the bottom of the social order. To enforce their dominance, they sometimes resorted

2. Beth Bell to George [Houser] et al., August 13, 1947; Beth Bell to George Houser, July 28, 1947; Beth Bell to George Houser, September 21, 1947, Series 3, Executive Secretary’s File, file 55, the Papers of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), 1941–1967, State Historical Society of Wisconsin Library; available on microfilm at Watson Library, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Reel 13 (hereafter cited as “CORE Papers”).


to violence. Just months after the war ended, a mob invaded the home of one of the town’s black residents and, while one intruder held a cocked pistol to the owner’s temple, the others plundered and demolished his home. Whites grew more aggressive after the Exoduster movement, which brought thousands of southern blacks to Kansas in 1879 and swelled the black population of Lawrence from about 17 percent of the total in 1870 to approximately 23 percent by the next census. Responding to this influx, whites threatened to lynch black prisoners in four separate incidents between 1879 and 1883. “The death penalty . . . or lynch law, are believed to be the only terrors that will prevent the continual recurrence of such bloody affairs,” a newspaper concluded after “a young colored man” killed a white man during a dispute near town in November 1879. When officials arrested an alleged rapist in 1880, the Kansas Daily Tribune claimed to oppose mob violence in principle but clearly coveted a lynching, which might “forever relieve the land of one hell hound, and lend a hint to others that would be heeded.”

In 1882 whites put this theory into practice when a mob secured three black prisoners accused of murder. “They were marched to the bridge, and on the middle pier a halt was made. Prayers were short then,” reported the Lawrence Daily Journal. “Pete Vinegar, George Robertson and Isaac King were each swung over the bridge and their bodies left dangling over the muddy Kaw.” With this spectacular exhibition, whites struck terror into blacks, a large number of whom stayed away from a protest meeting called by black leaders in response to the lynchings. “Many a man who wanted to attend did not dare to,” reported the Lawrence Daily Journal; “all sorts of rumors were afloat.” Purveyors of the free-state narrative faced great difficulty in reconciling this event. “Lawrence stands for Kansas, and the best in Kansas,” worried former-abolitionist and early settler, the Reverend Richard Cordley. “This deed will go abroad to our shame.” Evidently, most whites disagreed. “The lynching of the last summer has only served to keep up a spirit of mob law in our midst,” lamented the Lawrence Daily Journal after crowds threatened to lynch yet another prisoner in 1883. “Whenever a crime is committed of any magnitude [by a black man] the cry among a certain class of men is ‘Hang him!’” In that case, a businessman provided a glimpse of white attitudes. Black criminality had “caused a general feeling of indignation to prevail against the whole class. . . . Some day a regular war will follow some outrage committed by them.”

Building on this legacy, whites introduced increasingly rigid, if largely de facto, Jim Crow practices that excluded or segregated blacks in restaurants, theaters, schools, restaurants, and all other places of public accommodation. ...
Douglas County farmers armed with ropes hunted for two black youths accused of assault. "Had the people in the neighborhood found the wretches they would have made short work of them," reported the Lawrence Daily World. When officers finally captured the accused, they prepared for a siege. "There was strong talk of lynching . . . but no mob appeared at the jail, although one was expected." Again in 1909 law officers had to be vigilant in the case of Underwood Taylor, accused of "an attempted assault on a five year old [white] girl. . . . Excitement in Baldwin last evening reached fever heat over the crime," reported the Lawrence Daily Journal, and "it was found necessary to hurry him [to the county jail in Lawrence] as soon as possible. The child's father declared that he . . .

After the Civil War, white Kansans created a free-state narrative that cast their state—and themselves—as staunchly committed to racial equality. Those in Lawrence, the territorial hotbed of abolitionism, subscribed to this narrative with particular fervor, fusing it with the story of the 1863 sacking of their town by William Clarke Quantrill. Survivors of the raid, photographed here at an April 1925 reunion outside Strong Hall at the University of Kansas in Lawrence, met to remember the deep legacy of the event sixty-two years after its occurrence.

housed, and employment. “Isn’t it a burning shame?,” asked the Historic Times, the city’s black paper, in a report on the expansion of these practices in the 1890s. “Right here in the city of Lawrence, ‘the Athens of the West,’ ‘neath the eaves of the great State University, and mid churches that preach ‘out of one blood God created all nations,’” white men were permitted to “defile the good name of the fairest city in the West.” Over subsequent decades, whites consolidated Jim Crow. A longtime resident later remembered that “a lot of the discrimination around here seems to have cropped up” in the years from “the early 1900s until about World War II.” Although they did not invoke lynch law after 1882, whites continued to threaten it. In 1898, for example,}

would kill Taylor and other men in Baldwin were ready to serve him justice from the hands of fathers instead of waiting for it to be meted out by the law.”

As these incidents suggest, the police had begun to act proactively and successfully to suppress mob violence by the turn of the century. To some degree, however, they and their supporters in the justice system may also have assumed the role of the mob as the enforcers of white supremacy. In 1913, for instance, an officer engaged in a shootout with two blacks who were attempting to catch a free ride on a passenger train. One of the blacks—Jack Walker—was killed; the other—Walter Peterson—was apprehended with minor gunshot wounds. The latter had recently received an acquittal for killing a white man, a verdict that was evidently unpopular among whites. Consequently, officials labored to ensure that Peterson would not avoid the consequences of his alleged criminality a second time. Although it seemed likely that the officer had shot Walker, the Lawrence Daily Journal-World reported that “there is a strong suspicion . . . that Walker was [accidentally] killed by Peterson.” When physical evidence did not support this claim, authorities contemplated new charges that, in their absurdity, indicated their obsession with ensuring the prisoner’s conviction. “It is quite probable that Walter Peterson . . . will face prosecution by the United States government,” reported the Journal-World. “The train which the negroes attempted to board was carrying government mails. As a result of the clash with the train crew the mail was delayed.” In a December 17 editorial, the paper left little doubt that whites harbored a grudge against Peterson, recognized the officer’s role in the killing of Walker, and strongly supported the message of vengeance expressed by the shooting and by the response to it. “Juries do not always do the public a service when they strain at an effort to acquit,” it declared. “A policeman is said to have fired the shot [which killed the black man]. If he did it was in the line of his duty. A policeman who will not shoot is not worth much to the public.”

11. Lawrence Daily World, August 23, 1898; Lawrence Daily Journal, August 23, 1898; Lawrence Daily Journal, May 6, 1909. The 1909 Journal report suggests that the whites in Baldwin used questionable assault charges against Taylor in an effort to deter black migration prompted by new employment opportunities there. “Taylor vows that he is innocent of the crime and that he had been merely playing with the child, but the constable says that he is guilty,” the newspaper reported. “Taylor is a stranger in Baldwin having come there with a number of men to work at the waterworks plant, which is just being put in there.”

12. Lawrence Daily Journal-World, December 15, 16, and 17, 1913; Lawrence Daily Journal, August 11 and 12, November 12, and December 17 and 18, 1913; Lawrence Daily Gazette, December 15, 1913; Topeka Daily Capital, August 11 and 13, and December 15, 1913.

In the late nineteenth century, KU’s few black students participated in some interracial activities, including athletics. As racial lines hardened, however, they lost many of these privileges. By the 1920s and 1930s, whites overtly marginalized blacks, refusing to use “tainted” facilities and going out of their way to advertise their disdain. Summarizing the situation in 1928, Chancellor Ernest H. Lindley, pictured here, observed: “the bald social fact is that the Negro is not getting his full rights in the University, nor in Lawrence, nor in Kansas, nor anywhere else in this country, so far as I know.”

At KU, administrators and students encouraged the development of overtly racist practices. In the late nineteenth century, the school’s few black students participated in some interracial activities, including athletics, and enjoyed an integrated campus restaurant. As racial lines hardened, however, they lost many of these privileges. As a harbinger of things to come, white students in 1902 seized a black cadaver from the dissection laboratory and hanged it on campus. Over the next two decades, whites marginalized blacks, refusing to use “tainted” facilities and going out of their way to advertise their disdain. University of Kansas Chancellor Ernest H. Lindley offered an example of the problem to the editor of the Crisis, W. E. B. Du Bois, in December 1930. “Whenever colored girls use the rest rooms considerably,” he noted, “the white girls make no protest but simply abandon these rooms to the colored girls.” As the number of black students increased, the administrators felt compelled to impose a stricter “color line.” In the 1910s and 1920s they segregated the
cafe; under the influence of legendary basketball coach Forrest “Phog” Allen they also began to exclude blacks from many sports.13 “The bald social fact is that the Negro is not getting his full rights in the University, nor in Lawrence, nor in Kansas, nor anywhere else in this country, so far as I know,” acknowledged Chancellor Lindley in 1928. In a passage published in 1934 by the liberal university publication, the Dove, a student again appealed to the free-state mythology, arguing that “all in all it does not seem that the Negro is getting all that is coming to him in the University of this state which was one of the pioneers in the fight for his liberty.”

By World War II, white Lawrenceans had established a pernicious modus vivendi with the town’s black residents. They allowed blacks to attend largely integrated schools and to shop in most retail stores (although employees monitored them closely and forbade them from trying on clothes), but they enforced segregation or exclusion in movie theaters, restaurants, bars, pools, and bowling alleys, among other places. Local blacks knew where they could go; whites, however, did not shy away from drawing the color line explicitly for newcomers as circumstances warranted.15 “An event of note occurred in the summer of 1944, and again focused attention on that perennial trouble spot, the Lawrence theaters,” observed one student several years later in her report on “The Young Women’s Christian Association in the Field of Race Relations at the University of Kansas.” “Two Negro girls... and their dates one evening attempted to attend the Granada Theatre. They were immediately repulsed in no uncertain terms and with a great deal of unpleasantness.” In enforcing these practices, whites freely violated the state’s antidiscrimination laws. Reflecting on the nature of Jim Crow in Kansas in 1943, KU Chancellor Deane W. Malott mused that there was “a conflict between the legal rights and the established customs of the people of the state.”16

On the KU campus at this same time black students continued to endure the stultifying effects of long standing Jim Crow practices. “Blacks then could not participate in intercollegiate athletics (this was true until the early 1950s), were segregated at the cafeteria in the union, [and] were not allowed to take part in activities like the orchestra or glee club,” observed Monhollon. Nor could they mingle freely with their white counterparts. In 1945, for instance, Dean Donald M. Swarthout took strong measures to curb interracial sexuality, targeting student McKensie Ferguson, accused of “too close and frequent contacts with certain of the white students.” The dean reported that “three young women were called in and warned of a growing amount of talk” because of their association with Ferguson, whose conduct came under closer scrutiny after reports surfaced that he had been seen with female students in his Hoch Auditorium practice room. At least once that fall, Swarthout warned Ferguson that if this happened again, he would be expelled. Within days, a watchman spotted a “colored boy”—alleged to be Ferguson—in another compromising position with a “young colored lady.” The following day, a student reported that “Ferguson was in one of the practice rooms with a young woman or women in Frank Strong Hall with a chair braced against the door from the inside.” In that case, the beleaguered Ferguson admitted that he had been talking with fellow students but insisted that “the door was well open.” Not persuaded, Swarthout demanded that Ferguson withdraw from the university. “This he has already done.”17

In the fall of 1945, white conservatives confronted the first post-war challenge to the racial status quo when activists protested the police ejection of Corporal Wesley S. Sims, Jr., and his wife, Rosa, from a theater for refusing to sit in the “colored” section. Civil rights activists seized on the case because of its symbolic value. They hoped that this treatment of a decorated veteran who had received a Purple Heart might shame the majority into recognizing

16. Deane W. Malott to Governor Andrew Schoeppel, March 19, 1943, General Correspondence, 1941/42–1942–43, folder “Governor 1942/43,” Chancellor’s Office, Deane W. Malott, University Archives, RG 2.10.3, Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas, Lawrence (hereafter cited as “Malott Papers, UA”); Mary Wisner Lees, “The Young Women’s Christian Association in the Field of Race Relations at the University of Kansas,” [1948], 40, University Archives, D423, Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas, Lawrence.
the contradiction between the war against fascists abroad and continuing racism against blacks at home. As Sims put it, “Just what was I fighting for?” In this case, conservatives deftly neutralized the threat to Jim Crow by rushing “through a revocation of the city ordinance requiring a city license for theaters.” This move, an activist noted, “was obviously to attempt protection for the theaters in case of suit under the Civil Rights statute, since the law states that there shall be no distinction made in ‘any place of entertainment or amusement for which a license is required by any of the municipal authorities of this state.’” While they won this round easily, conservatives would soon face more daunting challenges because the Sims case proved to be a catalyst for civil rights activists who worked earnestly, if intermittently, to topple Jim Crow over the next decade and a half. 18

Most white Lawrencians, like most white northerners generally, adhered to the comfortable and overlapping fictions that “racists” were uneducated “rednecks” who lived in the South and that the South was the only section of the country where white supremacy was an organizing principle. Given their own relative lack of Jim Crow laws, they rarely recognized the brutal racial inequalities in northern society or considered their own role in perpetuating them. A student epitomized this position in a 1958 editorial in which he lambasted the “bigotry” of white students in Arkansas while simultaneously applauding race relations in his own community. “Here at KU we do not [need to] call ourselves integrated,” he cheered, because “we are simply free, as we should be.” Another student, however, took issue with this rose-colored characterization. “In Arkansas, at least, they can claim a southern tradition of intolerance and tyranny,” he wrote. “In Lawrence we have our own version, home-grown and free-lance, just as vicious, and just as stupid.” 19

Whether they chose to admit it or not, most white Lawrencians were “ill-disposed toward racial equality.” Had they not been, Jim Crow would quite simply have withered and died. A KU student scolded his fellow citizens on this score in 1956, reminding them that “it isn’t the KKK that retards desegregation, but good loyal American citizens like yourself, who are continuously seeking the line of least resistance—the comfortable adjustment to a problem that is by its very nature unadjustable [sic].” That same year, another student articulated the popular views of many white residents: “Few people believe in interracial marriage, few believe in dealing with a so-called racially ‘inferior’ group in business, few believe in socializing with an unacceptable race, few believe in worshipping in the same church and pew with a member of another race.” 20

 Governed by prejudice, whites enforced their racist practices despite the fact that the black population was both small numerically and shrinking proportionately. In 1940, only 1,352 blacks resided in town and they accounted for only 9.4 percent of the total population. By 1960, they would increase in numbers by 305 but decline to only 5.0 percent of the total due to the disproportionate growth in the white population. At the university, black students remained small in absolute numbers and never reflected their proportion of the population generally. Even though “KU’s enrollment, like that of most state universities, shattered record after record” after the war, black students would still only number around two hundred annually. During the 1948–1949 and 1949–1950 school years respectively, when the GI bill was encouraging education for returning veterans, black students accounted for only 221 and 201 of the 7,209 and 8,758 students, or 3.1 and 2.3 percent. 21

Throughout the brief period under investigation, conservatives repeatedly employed a limited number of politically palatable arguments to justify the status quo. Only in rare cases, however, did they resort publicly to those based on the crudest sort of racism. When a writer for the University Daily Kansan condemned what he viewed as the immorality of Jim Crow in 1956, Abels wrote him a letter, portions of which were soon published, 18. Lawrence Daily Journal-World, November 1, 1945; Beth Bell, “Recent Activities of K.U. CORE,” [July 1947], CORE Papers. For more on this incident see Lees, “The YWCA in the Field of Race Relations,” 43–44; Lawrence Daily Journal-World, November 27, 1945; McCusker, “The Forgotten Years,” 72–73.
expressing his view that white supremacy was ordained by the highest of powers. “What do you mean?” he asked, arguing that “God made both races—was he immoral?” Increasingly, however, local conservative leaders were becoming much more circumspect about expressing such views in public forums. They seemed to understand the serious concerns articulated by national leaders over, first, the incongruity between the country’s opposition to fascism and communism abroad and its tolerance of white supremacy at home and, second, the potential impact of blatant racism on American claims to leadership among the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Undoubtedly, whites continued to employ flagrantly racist rhetoric in their daily lives. In 1947 a businessman, railing against civil rights activists, reportedly blurted out his concern “that ‘the next thing you know the niggers will be taking out the white girls.’” In fact, as late as 1970, a gas station attendant freely used this sort of language in a discussion with a visitor to the city. “Hell, I don’t even know what a racist is,” he told him nonchalantly. “I do a lot of business with niggers.”

In most cases, conservatives dressed their opposition to black equality in more respectable garb. Conditioned by the free-state narrative, many flatly rejected any assertion that black Kansans endured hardships, claiming, as an integrationist minister summarized, that


“there isn’t any racial discrimination at all and we have no problem to worry about.”24 In a letter to the Journal-World in 1960, a woman expressed incredulity over recent demands for an end to Jim Crow. “It is a mystery to me, after living in Lawrence most of my life, [that] all of a sudden there has developed a prejudice against Negroes.” Surveying his town the following year, a KU student saw little to contradict the city’s cherished mythology. “If conditions are so bad here in Lawrence,” he told the Kansas, “it is surprising to me that there have been no large scale spontaneous demonstrations by the colored people . . . to secure their own rights.”25

Building on this conviction, conservatives charged that blacks were quite satisfied with prevailing social relations and that white activists, driven by a “selfish, childish, thirst for publicity,” were inventing problems where they did not exist. “I have heard less about the problem from members of the race than I have from a certain other group,” Abels, then a state senator, grumbled in a 1947 letter. A student agreed, contending that black people—unlike the white activists who manipulated them—were sufficiently courteous to accept some restrictions out of deference to their white counterparts. “Colored people,” he insisted, “don’t want to force themselves on anyone.” Conservatives adhered so deeply to this belief that they sometimes seemed to pity rather than loathe black activists, whom they viewed as the ignorant puppets of white intellectuals. During a confrontation between activists and conservatives in 1947, a businessman allegedly turned to the black protestors and advised them that the whites “had led them into this mess and that they (Negroes) would be the ones to suffer.”26 In making threats of this sort against black activists, conservatives pointedly undermined any claim that white Lawrencians did not discriminate.

Business people and their supporters defended Jim Crow by asserting property rights over civil rights, arguing, as Abels put it, that “it is the owners [sic] ‘right’ to operate the business as he or she sees fit” and, as a corollary to that, to choose his or her own customers. Unlike the civil right, he asserted, the property right “is not a phoney [sic] right dreamed up by mistaken persons who never back up their demands with a financial investment.”27 Lawrence Mayor John Weatherwax reiterated this position in 1958. “If a man wants to open a business and serve only white or Negro customers, that is his privilege,” he told the Kansas. “And to force him to serve both is to infringe upon free enterprise.” Adherents of this view cast business people as unwitting hostages to majority rule. “Instead of serving one individual,” the businessperson faced “the problem of serving a large number,” theorized a KU senior. “He must adopt policies which will satisfy his clientele. If most of his patrons or society dictates that he must refuse service to certain individuals, then he is powerless to do otherwise.” A waiter reported that her boss “doesn’t care, one way or another” about maintaining Jim Crow; he cared only about doing “what will be best for his customers.” In placing the blame for Jim Crow on their white customer base rather than on their own personal prejudice, business owners were clearly, if inadvertently, signaling again that blatantly racist rhetoric was losing its legitimacy. As the Kansas rightly noted, “we have never heard a restaurant owner admit he was prejudiced.”28

Conservatives resented efforts to “force” them to interact with blacks, arguing that activists should “allow the adjustment to come naturally.” One KU student, for example, proclaimed his support for the aims of the civil rights workers but disavowed their aggressive methods. “By the brashness of your tactics you have alienated more people than you have converted,” he warned. “This is unfortunate as it is traceable to your own stupidity.”29

The head of the Lawrence Chamber of Commerce similarly rebuked student activists in 1958 over a boycott against Jim Crow businesses. “We have worked on this problem on a gradual basis and I think if we continue on that basis we can have some progress,” he warned, but “rushing this thing isn’t going to do any good.” Although race was inextricably intertwined with this concern, many conservatives earnestly opposed government interference in their lives and the use of legal mandates to alter social beliefs. Mayor Weatherwax, for one,

24. Rev. C. Fosburg Hughes to J. Oscar Lee, February 7, 1947, Correspondence, 1947, box 1, Lawrence League for the Practice of Democracy, Kansas Collection, RH Ms 48, Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas, Lawrence (hereafter cited as “LLPD papers”).
26. University Daily Kansas, April 30, 1948; Edwin F. Abels to C. Fosberg Hughes, January 29, 1947, LLPD Papers; Summer Session Kansas (University of Kansas, Lawrence), July 29, 1947; Bell to Houser, August 13, 1947, CORE Papers.
29. “What About the Movies,” Eagle (University of Kansas), April 22, 1947, University Archives, Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas, Lawrence; Summer Session Kansas, August 8, 1947.
When expedient, conservatives applied pressure to university administrators to suppress student activists. In 1946, for example, a Lawrence attorney wrote Chancellor Deane W. Malott to express his anger upon learning that black and white women had begun living together in a housing unit. To demonstrate his protest, the lawyer refused to rent the two large apartments he owned next door to the offending housing unit. Malott, pictured here greeting KU students during his first few days as chancellor in 1939, held firm and the lawyer kept his housing—enough for fifteen students—vacant for a year before selling it. Photo courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas Libraries, Lawrence.

“wished restaurants here would serve both Negro and white customers, but that the issue was not a step to be taken by the city government.”

Many found “artificial forcing” to be particularly objectionable because it elevated blacks to the level of whites even though “they haven’t earned it.” Justin W. Hill, one of the most prominent businessmen in Lawrence, articulated this position unmistakably—and drew a clear distinction between “Negroes” and white “people.” “I don’t think that passing laws will improve the feelings of people toward Negroes. You don’t make friends by forcing things on people.” He concluded that, “before the Negroes will be accepted by whites as equals, they will have to raise their standards of living to the accepted level of the community.” In identifying this central concern among whites in Lawrence in the 1960s, Monhollon writes that “the dichotomy was clear and racially based: Whites deserved full participation as American citizens, blacks did not; whites should decide when blacks deserve that equality.”

Reflecting widespread anti-intellectualism and a deeply entrenched “town-gown” conflict, conservatives opposed civil rights activism in part because they viewed it as a heavy-handed effort by university elites to impose their values on ordinary, virtuous, hard-working Lawrencians. “Now and then Kansas citizens read about some of the antics and projects by students at state schools and the nature of the events is such to make folks wonder if the youngsters deserve the opportunities the citizenry is helping to provide via taxes,” the Journal-World concluded in 1961. Because many faculty members and students hailed from outside of Kansas, they also saw this activism as an affront to state sovereignty by those who had no real stake in the long-term fate of the community. “At Kansas University, a goodly number of the ‘wild hare’ activities fostered by students are the products of the imagination of out-of-state students,” it claimed. “Time and again the top scholars, the top leaders . . . are of Kansas origin,” proving that “there is considerable merit to being born and bred out ‘on the prairies’ and ‘in the sticks.’” Despite widespread acceptance of this logic, most out-of-state students were probably indistinguishable from their in-state peers. As a native Kansan retorted in the Journal-World, “many of your ‘alleged working liberals’ and ‘student malcontents’ are Kansans.”

Conservatives often objected to what they viewed as special treatment for blacks, conveniently overlooking the fact that they required this “special treatment” precisely because whites discriminated against them. In 1956, for example, they railed against a proposal to build a city-run pool open to black children when there was already a private pool serving the white ones who accounted for most of the children in the city. In a letter to the Journal-World, “local patriot” Warren Zimmerman expressed his outrage. “For the benefit of possibly 250 or 300, and that for three months only in a year, the city is being asked to vote practically a quarter million dollars in added taxes,” he fumed, an amount of such consequence, in his view, that it would be better spent on a benefit for the majority, not a tiny minority. Besides, he argued, white families were also compelled to do without luxuries because of financial constraints but they did not make unreasonable and “socialistic” demands on the government. “What about them? They are just as deserving.”

31. Summer Session Kansan, August 8, 1947; University Daily Kansan, April 30, 1948; January 20, 1961; Monhollon, “This is America?”, 50, 43.
In a related concern, some believed that civil rights reforms constituted a perverse form of reverse discrimination, an attempt to “solve discrimination by discriminating against a few of the discriminators.” Reacting to a protest at a movie theater in 1947, one student affirmed his solidarity with the owner. “[He] has been more than fair,” he told a reporter. “I think the only discrimination has been against the whites.”

Lawrence City Manager Harold E. Horn hit on this concern again in 1960, when he bristled at charges that city hall had discriminated against a young woman who applied for a job, suggesting that blacks believed that they should receive employment ahead of more qualified whites simply because they were black. “There is no reason why any person shouldn’t be considered for city jobs if they qualify,” he told the Kansan. “If she qualified she would have as much chance as anyone else. . . . This does not mean that we will hire a person simply because he or she is colored.” Although the mantra of “reverse discrimination” is generally associated with the mid-1960s and beyond, white Lawrencians were clearly beginning to assemble its essential ingredients much earlier.

In an international political environment ripe with suspicion, many assumed that civil rights activists were part of a foreign Communist conspiracy. During the anticommunist hysteria of the late 1940s, one local businessman was certain that a “radical element” was at the root of what he viewed as the un-American efforts of KU activists. In a letter, he warned Chancellor Malott that, “where there is smoke there is usually some fire and there is quite a lot of smoke around.” A student at KU in the 1950s came to the conclusion that “certain teachers and students were confirmed communists and there were a lot of other ‘Isms’ he didn’t like.” Abels identified similar influences at work during a protest in the summer of 1960. “Practically none of our good Lawrence citizens are implicated,” he claimed. Instead, the protestors consisted of “Communists,” “bearded men,” and “colored men who are strangers and others who appear to be foreigners.” Abels did not, however, believe that all those who embraced leftist ideology were committed Communists. In a 1948 editorial that dripped with condescension, he held out hope that the misguided children who seized on it in blind juvenile rebellion would eventually grow out of it. “College kids who claim to be very liberal,” he told readers, usually “get back on the right track after they get a job and a home.” Given that many civil rights activists were themselves committed anticommunists, they chafed at this effort to discredit them. As one complained, “It is not an easy thing to be called a Communist just because you can’t subscribe to an unprovable doctrine of white superiority.”

Finally, many conservatives shared a visceral fear that integration would encourage interracial sexuality—that, if civil rights workers “insist on rubbing elbows, certain other conditions are going to enter into the picture.” In a letter to the KU chancellor, a citizen made this concern central to his opposition to civil rights. “We have no quarrel with the colored race,” he maintained, “but most assuredly there is no desire on our part to eat, sleep and mix with them socially.” Three white men bristled with anger over the same issue as they watched black and white protestors in 1960. “Ain’t that a white girl walking between them two colored guys?,” they reportedly asked each other. Whites were so fearful of interracial sexuality that even white civil rights activists were not immune to this concern. When a handsome black activist visited Lawrence in the late 1940s, a member of the integrationist Lawrence League for the Practice of Democracy worried that certain KU students had welcomed him a little too enthusiastically: “What if one of those girls would fall in love with him?”

In his inimitable style, Abels fused these two explosive fears—the Communist threat and interracial sexuality—in, of all places, a 1948 report of a trip that he and other state leaders had taken to Washington, D.C., where they urged army engineers to approve a flood control plan for the Kansas River. While en route, he and his counterparts became embroiled in a debate with a “thin-faced chap who said he was a communist.” To underscore the intellectual bankruptcy of his adversary, Abels claimed that the Communist lost interest in politics when “a fashionably 34. “Admit A&M!,” Eagle, April 22, 1947; Summer Session Kansan, July 25, 1947.


dressed young Negress . . . breezed into the coach.” At that point, Communist became Lothario, engaging in the vilest conduct with a woman of self-evidently low character. “The Communist chap got very much interested; he forgot his debate in his enthusiasm to buy the gal a bottle of beer. During the drinking he got one arm around the woman, smoothed her stockings . . . and got most everybody in the car so thoroughly disgusted that they wanted to throw them both off the train.”

In this account of an exchange between common-sense businessmen and two social pariahs, Abels underscored what he saw as the depravity of both communism and interracial sex.

Coincident with these arguments justifying the racial status quo, conservatives also employed a variety of tactics throughout this period to defend it. In most cases, they simply refused to submit to the demands of activists who, in many instances, wielded little leverage. Of the twelve prominent businessmen invited to a meeting with the Reverend C. Fosburg Hughes to discuss the formation of a committee on racial discrimination in 1947, only seven showed. Over the course of the meeting, these seven emphatically rejected the need for any such committee. “Two or three of the men who have very violently prejudiced attitudes finally said that they would be willing to be on the inside in order to more effectively say ‘No’ to different proposals.” Though discouraged, Hughes admitted that “it amused me no end to discover that seven busy men would talk for two and a half hours about something they didn’t think was a problem!”

In another refusal to reform, this time in 1952, a cafe owner battled down a toothless petition demanding integration with an insouciance that underscored the strength of his hand. “I talked to the other restaurant owners,” he told the petitioners, “and we decided it was ‘no dice.’” In other cases, businessmen simply recognized that they could stall action indefinitely by dragging out negotiations because they knew that activists often agreed to cease protests during talks. Even when they reached agreement on reforms, businessmen often engaged in backsliding. In 1950, a theater manager assured activists that he would relax discriminatory seating and then largely ignored his commitment over the next three years. When challenged in 1953, he reported that “Negroes were seated outside of the rear south section . . . on occasions.” Clearly, businessmen were frequently successful in giving activists “the run-around.”

When expedient, conservatives applied pressure to university administrators to suppress student activists, warning that they would hold KU responsible for their activities. In 1946, J. Clifton Ramsey, an attorney, wrote Chancellor Malott to express his anger upon learning that black and white women had begun living together in a housing unit. “In order to show my protest against this condition, I am absolutely refusing to rent the two


University of Kansas administrators were not altogether consistent as they navigated their way through the racial tensions on their campus. Two years after Chancellor Malott refused the demands of one landlord in Lawrence to close down interracial student housing, administrators revoked the status of a campus organization calling itself the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and known for organizing high-profile sit-ins. Meeting with the groups after this decision, KU Executive Secretary Laurence Woodruff, pictured here, “admitted responding to business pressures but mentioned that this was still a capitalistic system and that unless the University took some action it might mean loss of K.U. appropriations and loss of jobs for administrators.” Photo courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas Libraries, Lawrence.

large apartments next door to this deplorable situation,” he advised. As one of the women occupying the offending housing unit noted, Ramsey put the university administrators in “a difficult position . . . for housing for students was extremely scarce then, and they regretted losing facilities for fifteen girls.” In that case, however, KU officials held firm and Ramsey kept his house vacant for a year before selling it.

Conservative businessmen aggressively used this tactic to deal with a KU chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), a national interracial civil rights organization that enraged many whites with high-profile sit-ins in 1947 and 1948. While university administrators resisted Ramsey’s demands in 1946, they submitted to those against CORE. After a theater sit-in, administrators revoked its status as a campus organization. Following this ruling, KU Executive Secretary Laurence Woodruff met with group members. “As we were virtually sure he would do, he refused us the right to be considered an ‘official’ group, which means in effect that we are outlawed on the campus,” reported Beth Bell, a white KU senior and the leader of CORE. When the activists quarreled with him, Woodruff reportedly made a startling confession. “He admitted responding to business pressures but mentioned that this was still a capitalistic system and that unless the University took some action it might mean loss of K.U. appropriations and loss of jobs for administrators.” CORE subsequently issued a statement charging that KU was little more than “a tool for the propagation of businessmen’s whims and an institution existing for their benefit, not that of the students or the people.” Business people were equally enraged in 1960 when protesters picketed the city’s white-only pool. As Abels growled, “the University of Kansas lost a great deal of good will and support throughout the business section and among the thinking people of the community.”

Reflecting and molding public opinion, Abels mobilized whites against threats to the status quo. He attacked a bond issue proposed in 1945 by Phog Allen to build a city-run swimming pool for whites and then to open the older one (originally open only to whites) to blacks. Like Allen, the editor “definitely favored segregation”; yet he saw the athletic director’s proposal to give blacks access to separate and inferior facilities as an unjustifiably expensive alternative to the current practice of outright exclusion. Quite simply, Abels objected to spending any tax-payer money for another pool when the white-only “pool now being operated is going along nicely.” Enough voters agreed with him to succeed in defeating the bond issue. Abels led a similar campaign against a proposal to build an integrated pool in 1956, and cheered when voters again gave the plan “an ‘extremely healthy’ spanking.” In 1961, he lobbied the state legislature to withhold needed funds from KU after a sit-in against discrimination. “The men in the legislature are practical fellows,” he opined. “Just what will be the effect of the crusade of the student paper to get two taverns to sell beer to a few University students who happen to be colored is only a guess but it certainly will not be helpful.”

Considering the ease with which they could thwart the efforts of civil rights activists in so many instances, conservatives rarely felt compelled to forge formal coalitions. They were not a counter “movement”—they simply responded pragmatically to each threat as it presented itself, sometimes on their own and sometimes in informal alliance with a handful of like-minded peers. They did coalesce more formally in 1947, however, in response to the theater sit-in launched by CORE. “The town,” Bell observed, “has certainly been stirred by our activity.” The theater owner, Stanley Schwahn, a man active in community and state affairs, proved to be a formidable adversary. First, he reminded CORE that the revocation of the license ordinance after the Sims incident two years before gave him wide latitude. “Since I am no longer licensed,” he advised, “I retain the privilege [sic] of working out our own problems without interference of any laws.” Reflecting his organizational abilities and his standing among his peers, Schwahn then united business

43. Bell to Houser, September 21, 1947, CORE Papers (emphasis in original); Beth Bell et al., to Chancellor Deane W. Malott, September 18, 1947. General Correspondence, 1947/1948, C.O.R.E. folder, Malott Papers, UA, 2/10/1.
44. Lawrence Outlook, July 14, 1960.
45. Lawrence Outlook, November 8, 1945; November 8, 1956; January 12, 1961. See also Lawrence Daily Journal World, November 3 and 13, 1956. Interestingly, Allen is sometimes lauded for his role in dismantling Jim Crow during the 1950s, when KU began actively recruiting black sports talent, including the dominating Wilt Chamberlain. A recent article in the Lawrence Daily Journal World, for example, lauds Allen, “KU’s legendary basketball coach from 1920 to 1956 who famously insisted Massachusetts Street businesses serve the equally legendary 7-foot-1 Wilt Chamberlain who played at KU from 1957 to 1958.” Schudy, “A History of Segregation.” Although Allen’s role in undoing segregation practices in the 1950s is significant, it ought to be balanced against his role in imposing these practices in the first place. See also, Aram Goudsozian, “‘Can Basketball Survive Chamberlain?’: The Kansas Years of Wilt the Stilt,” Kansas History: A Journal of the Central Plains 28 (Autumn 2005): 150–73.
For decades some Laurencians lobbied for a pool open to blacks, though bond measures in the 1940s and 1950s demonstrated that a majority of citizens did not support the idea. Again in the summer of 1960, conservatives succeeded in crushing a civil rights campaign against discrimination at the Jayhawk Plunge, the city’s de facto public pool, a facility that was open to non-members through single admission tickets—providing that the non-members were white. The matter sparked protests like the one pictured here. Photo courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas Libraries, Lawrence.

owners into an ephemeral group of their own, christening it (with baffling redundancy) the Lawrence Citizens for the Entertainment of the Citizens of Lawrence. Within days, business people throughout downtown posted signs reminding patrons that they “reserve the right to refuse service to persons of any race.”

Unquestionably, some business people were sympathetic to the goals of the civil rights movement. However, because so many of their peers adamantly opposed integration, they feared the repercussions associated with crossing them. J. D. King, a theater manager who consistently backtracked on his pledge to integrate, told civil rights workers that he was genuinely sensitive to their concerns but that “he definitely did not want to be put in the uncomfortable role of a ‘crusading’ Lawrence businessman.” He also expressed his conviction that any public announcement of his altered policies “would draw too much undesirable attention and criticism to himself.” King was probably prescient in his fears that he would be “corrected” by his peers. A white woman who initially agreed to rent an apartment to a black student in 1959 was “corrected” and consequently felt compelled to renege on the agreement. As KU Dean of Students Donald K. Alderson noted, the young man planned to occupy the apartment in the 1800 block of Louisiana Street in the spring of 1960 “until the landlady indicated that neighbors did not want a negro in one of her apartments.”

During protests in the summer of 1960, a very agitated Abels thundered his view that “this community has advanced far since the days when Negroes were hanged from the Kansas river bridge.” However inflammatory, few could dispute his assertion: in the decade and a half after World War II, whites largely refrained from the kind of violence that had earlier maintained white supremacy. In a case of limited violence in 1948, W. E. Murphy organized a group of students, many of them KU football players, to disperse black and white CORE members engaged in a sit-in at his restaurant, warning activists that “they stayed at their own risk.” Upon arrival, police authorized Murphy to use force. As they returned to their squad car, the mob dragged male activists outside and hurled them to the pavement; suggesting that chivalry remained very much alive, it permitted female activists to leave on foot. When a CORE member called police to request the arrest of the assailants, the dispatcher left little doubt that protesters could expect no protection: “My advice to you is to get your gang and clear out of there.” Whites undoubtedly continued to use physical intimidation in incidents that were simply outside the scrutiny of newspapers. In 1958,


48. Lawrence Outlook, July 14, 1960; see also Lawrence Daily Journal-World, April 16, 1948; University Daily Kansan, April 16, 1948; Kansas City Times, April 16, 1948; Call (Kansas City), April 23, 1948; Lawrence Outlook, April 22, 1948; McCusker, “The Forgotten Years,” 128–34.
for instance, a student planted a fake bomb in a KU office that employed a black secretary and several students from India, Iran, and Pakistan—“all dark-skinned people.” Although the chancellor framed the incident as a “college prank,” he privately confessed his doubt that “we shall ever convince these people” that the prank “was not intended to reflect on the color of their skin.”

By the mid-1950s, civil rights activists had achieved some success in driving Jim Crow into retreat throughout Lawrence and at the university. They had forced theater owners and barbers to desegregate and had almost entirely eradicated overt discrimination at KU, except in the fraternity and sorority systems. By this point, conservatives were no longer capable of holding back the wave of social change washing across the nation. “In the years following World War II, economic growth, combined with federal actions . . . undermined the authority of local . . . elites,” found historian Beth Bailey. “Lawrence, like cities and towns throughout the nation, became much less isolated,” as it became integrated ever more tightly into a national culture that was moving away from earlier social norms. Undoubtedly, conservatives also recognized that if they did not relax Jim Crow, Kansas might become linked in the national imagination with the South, the stifling racism of which was routinely under assault in the northern press. They seem to have recognized this clearly after the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas case, which put the state in the national spotlight. Assailing the intransigence of white leaders in the South, the Journal-World correctly predicted that “the change in Lawrence,” where there was no compulsory school segregation, “will be brought about in a friendly and peaceful atmosphere.” A KU student was equally eager to distinguish his state from Alabama when anti-integration riots erupted there in 1956, writing that, “We should be thankful that the people in this area are well ahead of the narrow thinking of a few in the South.”

Despite their losses on several fronts, conservatives were able to “hold the line” on many others. According to a 1954 study, thirty-three of thirty-eight restaurants reported that they continued to deny service to blacks or to enforce segregation. Of the remaining five, three were black-owned. In a survey four years later, just ten of forty restaurants served mixed groups and only “a few will serve Negroes alone.” Asked to report how many eateries discriminated in 1958, an official conceded that “the number is high.” Perhaps, suggested an activist sarcastically, restaurateurs might appreciate “another century or two to prepare public opinion.” Tavern keepers successfully utilized a loophole in the law to discriminate legally against blacks. “There is a state law that forces restaurant owners to serve persons of


all races,” reported the Journal-World after the 1961 sit-in, but “it appears this law does not apply to taverns. To be a ‘restaurant,’ an establishment must prepare food on the premises, and this is not done at Louise’s Bar.” Although many business people did submit to a 1959 public accommodations law, others continued to discriminate in housing and employment. “I contacted one of our leading real-estate agencies about a particular house that was for sale,” a black resident reported in 1961. “He would not give me any consideration. His explanation was that this particular real-estate property had been taken from his list, yet his sign is still up at this writing.” Near the end of the study period, one student correctly assessed the situation in the state at the time with the observation that, in “the free state of Kansas, segregation is more than something read about in dispatches from the deep South.”

In the summer of 1960, conservatives also succeeded in crushing a civil rights campaign against discrimination at the Jayhawk Plunge, the city’s de facto public pool, a facility that was open to non-members through single admission tickets—providing that the non-members were white. In a repetition of the Sims affair fifteen years before, city authorities repealed an ordinance requiring the licensing of pools, thereby exempting the Plunge from compliance with the 1959 public accommodations act. Explaining the repeal of the ordinance, officials promised to write a “good” new law, which “will stand the test of time.” Not surprisingly, however, they stalled in producing the new ordinance, precipitating a civil rights protest at the pool. Soon, the owner sold the Plunge and its new owners vowed to run the pool as a strictly enforced private club, exempting it from the public accommodations act. In this way, they once again crushed the protest and made the need for a new licensing ordinance “rather superfluous.”

As promised by Lawrence officials, however, City Attorney Charles Stough produced a new ordinance. Although he had worked assiduously on the repeal of the original pool licensing ordinance in order to forestall integration, Stough rather incongruously positioned his newly proposed regulation within the framework of the free-state narrative and, in the process, provided one more testament to the extraordinary resilience of that mythology. In a feat of remarkable intellectual dexterity, he portrayed the further delay of integrated swimming in Lawrence—a delay that persisted until the late 1960s—as further confirmation that Kansas was a land of racial equality and justice. “The State of Kansas,” he proclaimed in the grandiloquent preamble, “and more particularly the city of Lawrence, was the backdrop for freedom from the day the first settlers arrived in this locality . . . and gave impetus to the cause of freedom throughout . . . the world.”

Although civil rights activists seriously challenged Jim Crow in Lawrence between 1945 and 1961, they were never able to sustain their efforts over time. They relied instead on intermittent assaults, working vigorously for short periods, only to retire from the field for months or even longer. Nevertheless, racial conservatives clearly experienced these ephemeral challenges as a consequential and bewildering tempest of social change. In broader historical perspective, however, it is evident that the conservatives were actually confronting only the initial fitful gusts of a storm that would transform the city and the nation during the 1960s. As activists launched a more sustained and aggressive civil rights campaign during that decade, conservatives persisted in their efforts to deny or delay change, using many of the same arguments that they had employed over previous decades. In 1965, Justin Hill echoed his earlier views, condemning those blacks “demanding housing in suburbs developed by whites, jobs in companies developed by whites, the right to eat in restaurants and go in stores owned and developed by whites.” The “coloreds,” he maintained, “should earn the right to these things.” Other white business owners also employed many of the same tactics, which they had used with considerable success since 1945. “A Lawrence apartment building owner defended his refusal to rent to black students in 1965” by asking the activists “if they ‘were prepared to reimburse him for the loss of income’ that would result from the ‘exodus of white students’ unwilling to live near blacks.”

54. Monhollon, “This is America?”, 43, 51.
Confronted with a more vigorous and sustained threat in the 1960s, some whites revealed that they could, when pressed, still rally behind racial vengeance, challenging Abel’s assertion that the community had “advanced far since the days when Negroes were hanged.” In an incident reminiscent of the 1913 shooting of Walker and Peterson, William Garrett, a white policeman, shot and killed a nineteen-year-old black man, Rick “Tiger” Dowdell, in a confrontation in a dark alley on July 16, 1970. Whether or not Garrett killed Dowdell in self-defense, as determined by the coroner’s inquest, the shooting set off several nights of racial violence and resulted in a citywide curfew and the summoning of the National Guard. Dowdell’s death became a rallying point for those demanding racial equality, as evidenced by the poster held during this December 1970 rally. Photo courtesy of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas Libraries, Lawrence.

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I don’t really want to know. But they do exist.” In 1960, Abels could assert with some justification that whites had repudiated violent racism. From the vantage point of 1970, however, it seems possible to conclude that white Lawrencians did not resort to serious violence in the 1940s and 1950s primarily because they did not perceive blacks as an immediate or severe threat as did their counterparts during the twenty years after the Civil War and in the decade of the 1960s.55

While most whites undoubtedly opposed this more aggressive approach, they did betray by their comments in the aftermath of the shooting some alarming insights into the depths of racism still evident in Lawrence. “People are angry—and not just the Wallaceites and the hardhats,” one man declared. “There’s something in the air that stings.” A schoolteacher provided an equally troubling perspective. After “the only black student in the room” had voiced his anger over discrimination, this teacher nonchalantly detailed how he and the white students had silenced the youth. “I decided to do the best I could and I asked for a general discussion on what he had said. . . . It was a vigorous discussion. He finally ran out of answers. . . . He just couldn’t defend his position.” Even as the city teetered on the edge of a riot, the teacher adhered to the narrative of the free-state by dismissing the severity of prejudice in Lawrence. “I don’t really think he believed what he has been fed. We weren’t trying to break him down but he came as close that day as he’s ever come to admitting he doesn’t really believe this stuff about racism.” It is difficult to determine whether the teacher meant his final statement as a genuine expression of concern or as a vaguely felt desire: “I worried about him. . . . He’s a kid of average intelligence. But he’s hotheaded and susceptible and he could wind up dead in some alley like Dowdell.”56

Reinforcing the free-state story so treasured in Lawrence was an overarching and equally influential midwestern narrative, which depicted the rural heartland as a place of pastoral virtue, antithetical to the kind of racist violence commonly associated with the American South. For example, journalist, author, and former presidential speechwriter Bill Moyers, who just happened to be in Lawrence on the night that Garrett killed Dowdell in 1970, had difficulty reconciling the event with what he perceived as the bucolic essence of the town. “The man who invited me, [newspaper publisher] Dolph C. Simons, Jr., said that Lawrence is a pleasant place to live and to visit—‘A university town in the heart of Middle America should give you a chance to catch your breath,’ he had suggested—and I half expected to enjoy a brief respite from my work before heading west. . . . With the early sun behind my back and the twin prairies of sky and grassland racing westward ahead of me, there was no warning of what was to come.”57 Scholars have been no less susceptible to the influence of this imagined place. In a recent study of purposely all-white sundown towns, James W. Loewen illustrated the degree to which this idyllic Midwest image continues to influence scholarly perception: “Over and over I tell historians and social scientists about my research, and they assume I’m studying the Deep South,” he reported. “Even when I correct them, the correction often fails to register. I tell a sociologist friend that I’ve just spent months researching sundown towns in the Midwest. Ten minutes later he has forgotten and again assumes I have been traveling through the South.”58

Relatively recently historians have begun to challenge these strongly held perceptions and to redirect the historiography of the civil rights struggle from a narrowly southern emphasis to one more national in scope. Scholars like Thomas J. Sugrue, Arnold R. Hirsch, and Matthew C. Whitaker have charted the diverse efforts of business leaders, politicians, and ordinary citizens to defend or challenge white privilege in large industrial cities, such as Detroit and Chicago, during the post-World War II era. Furthermore, they have called for a broader investigation of the northern struggle over civil rights outside these principal urban centers. In this regard, Sugrue has observed that “struggles for civil rights also shaped small towns and suburbs—part of the northern story that has been almost completely overlooked.” This study reflects the shift in the historiography of the civil rights struggle

55. Moyers, Listening to America, 112, 97; Monhollon, “This is America?”, 165–68.
57. Ibid., 83.
with its focus on a northern city and advances it by an examination of a mid-sized, midwestern college town during the immediate post-war period.\textsuperscript{59}

Interestingly, Sugrue’s study also confirms to some degree Moyers’s Lawrence reflections about the night Dowdell was killed. Confronted with the dichotomy between the pastoral imagery of the heartland and the jarring reality of racial unrest, he was ultimately compelled to conclude that racism was neither a southern pathology nor a northern urban one; it afflicted places like Lawrence—notwithstanding its self-inoculating free-state and midwestern narratives—as thoroughly as it did any of those other American places more popularly associated with it. “Lawrence, Kansas, is a microcosm,” Moyers reflected. “Lawrence, Kansas, is the epitome of a troubled, spirited, inspired, frightened, complacent, industrious, selfish, magnanimous, spiteful, bewitching country. Lawrence, Kansas, is a little world.”\textsuperscript{60}


\textsuperscript{60} Moyers, Listening to America, 83.