Dan Dillon Casement posing for a Saddle and Sirloin Club portrait, circa 1939.
Courtesy of Morse Department of Special Collections, Kansas State University Libraries, Manhattan.
In 1938 Kansas rancher and nationally renowned livestock breeder Dan Dillon Casement wrote that “modern liberalism has departed so far from the methods and purposes of the original progressives that, were the dear old colonel [Theodore Roosevelt] with us today, the President [Franklin D. Roosevelt], I’m sure, would be constrained to denounce him as the world’s most dangerous and vociferous ‘Tory.’”1 Although some historians have written about Casement’s opposition to the New Deal, no scholarly work addresses his major political conversion from a self-styled progressive to an anti-New Dealer. An examination of this dramatic transformation enriches the historiography of both the Progressive movement and the New Deal, demonstrating that the connection between the two is fraught with complexities.2 On an intellectual level, there is a connection between Progressive Era policies and those of the New Deal, but this begs the question: If that is the case, how do we account for the fact that many self-styled progressives opposed the New Deal? Dan Casement’s political journey highlights important shifts in his philosophy in the period between World War I and the New Deal, which helps explain why a self-proclaimed progressive ultimately opposed Franklin Roosevelt’s domestic programs.

Daniel T. Gresham is a PhD student in history at Kansas State University and specializes in agricultural history, history of the American West, and environmental history.

The author would like to thank Professor Albert N. Hamscher and the graduate students of his seminar class as well as Professor James E. Sherow for their helpful comments and suggestions. He would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their recommendations.


This article examines how Dan Casement, a committed structural and social progressive, abandoned his crusade for reform in order to defend his moral conception of republican virtue—all the while believing he was defending the cause of progressivism. Originating in the late nineteenth century, the Progressive movement (or Era) was a period of great social, moral, and political reform. Although progressives promoted a myriad of reforms, most progressives—Casement included—desired to organize society based on the principles of order, efficiency, and science. Casement wanted structural reforms such as increased federal regulation within the cattle industry; social justice in terms of equal opportunity and aid for the underprivileged; and he was mildly receptive to moral reforms, which sought to impose nineteenth-century values such as hard work, self-reliance, and sobriety on modern society.3

By the 1920s he generally preferred private sector–led structural reforms except within the cattle industry, where he accepted federal assistance. At the same time, perceiving a national decline in morals, he advocated that farmers should endure the post–World War I depression in order to conserve their republican virtue. Casement then opposed the New Deal farm policy of limiting agricultural production through federal programs because he believed it would destroy the republican virtue of the small family farms and thereby weaken the nation’s character. In this respect, Casement assumed he was defending true progressivism against the New Deal. After Roosevelt’s 1936 reelection, Casement lost his optimism in the American people, abandoned more of his progressive ideals, and began to manifest a belief in biological determinism. He remained an outspoken critic of big government and an advocate of republican virtue until his death in 1953.

Born in 1868 to former Union brigadier general and successful railroad builder Jack Casement and suffragette Frances Jennings Casement, Daniel attended prestigious schools, earning a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from Princeton University in 1890 and a master’s degree in political science from Columbia University in 1891. By his own account, however, graduate school merely allowed him to prolong his boyhood. His true passion was ranching at his two properties, Unaweep in the Uncompahgre Range in southwestern Colorado and Juniata near Manhattan, Kansas. His father acquired joint ownership of Unaweep in the early 1880s and shortly thereafter Dan was working and spending time on the ranch during his time off from Princeton and Columbia. He received Juniata from his father on his 21st birthday. From 1897 to 1903 Casement used his professional education to amass a small fortune overseeing the construction of a railroad in Costa Rica. Upon his return to the United States, Casement met President Theodore Roosevelt through a mutual friend—James R. Garfield, who later served as secretary of the interior from 1907 to 1909. Casement was so impressed with Roosevelt that he decided “to participate to some extent thereafter in public affairs.”4

Casement was most active in the support of Roosevelt’s conservation program, which was crafted by chief forester of the U.S. Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot. Roosevelt and Pinchot promoted a “wise use” policy that stipulated federal regulation of natural resources for sustainability. Agreeing in principle with wise use, Casement tailored it specifically to the stockmen of the open range when he stated that “true conservation for the stock-man consists in the fullest possible use of natural resources compatible with their preservation and continued usefulness.”5 He even shared the famous and nebulous conservation motto of “the greatest good for the greatest number” when he argued that “efficient administration in the interest of all users is the only thing that can secure [ranchers] permanent and profitable enjoyment” of the public domain. Pinchot and Casement both understood conservation as “a scientific movement.” Casement’s view of conservation mirrored historian Samuel P. Hays’s definition of it as “rational

---


5. Casement to Breeders Gazette, January 1, 1911, folder 1, box 21, Casement Papers.
planning to promote efficient development and use of all natural resources.”

In 1906, putting Pinchot’s wise use philosophy into practice, the Roosevelt administration restricted ranchers’ use of public lands by issuing grazing permits for a fee. Casement, along with big ranching operations, supported the measure because it would limit the number of cattle on the range, thereby ending overgrazing. Conservationists favored large-scale ranchers because they had the capital to practice range management and provide long-term stability. Farmers, small ranchers, and states’ rights advocates, however, vehemently denounced this policy. Small ranchers opposed the grazing permits because they were fearful that these permits would only benefit the larger ranching operations, and states’ rights supporters opposed it because they would rather have the states regulate grazing than the federal government.

Casement maintained that through this policy, the Forest Service prevented what is now understood as the “tragedy of the commons,” which is the idea that “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” The theory posits that in the absence of coercion, individuals would pursue their own profit in spite of the common good; regulation, then, protected him and other cattlemen “against our own greed and that of our neighbors.” He further argued that “under the use that the law of the open range encourages, something besides the grass is taken annually, and that is its ability to produce as abundantly in the years to come.” In other words, he believed the open-range system was unsustainable. The individual rancher, Casement implied, could not be counted on to act in the interest of all stock raisers, which made coercion necessary. Casement praised the Forest Service’s actions, stating that “control of a large share of our ranges came none too soon to serve the best interests of the men that graze them.” Indeed, Casement advised western cattlemen that “co-operation with the Federal authorities” would create “something dependable to build a real business on.”

Born in 1868 to a Union general and railroad builder, Casement, pictured here in his teenage years, enjoyed a comfortable upbringing. He attended prestigious schools before entering Princeton University, where he earned a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering in 1890. The following year, he received a master’s degree in political science from Columbia University. Courtesy of Morse Department of Special Collections, Kansas State University Libraries, Manhattan.

Casement’s sentiments reflect his belief that the federal government made an excellent business partner. His high regard for the federal government is evident in his response to Colorado anticonservationists, led by stock raiser and Colorado Democratic governor Elias M. Ammons (1913–1915) and encompassing the majority of Colorado stockmen. Their opposition to federal regulation centered on their position as states’ rights advocates. For example, Ammons believed that Forest Service personnel—as representatives of federal authority—sought to do away with homesteads because homesteading was curtailed on National Forest land. Anticonservationists also believed

---

7. Ibid, 263.
9. Dan D. Casement to Breeders Gazette, January 1, 1911, folder 1, box 21, Casement Papers.

The Political Journey of Dan Casement
that the Forest Service lacked constitutional authority to make regulations that were essentially laws because those laws should originate with Congress.

Casement, on the other hand, found every Forest Service employee he had ever met to be “manly, decent and earnest.” He referred to the federal government as “impersonal and incorruptible” and praised the “honest purpose of the forest administration, which has been adhered to as closely as can reasonably be expected with the average human instruments at its command.” In gratitude to the federal government for preventing a tragedy of the commons on western range lands, Casement further explained his position in a February 1913 article for the Colorado Springs Gazette, stating that “a government wiser than ourselves took a hand and gave the more fortunate of us in the form of supervised and restricted grazing permits, real permanence to our industry, real assets for our balance sheets, real prosperity, mutual rights and needed protection in the enjoyment of these rights.” Casement considered the federal government not simply a good partner but an absolutely necessary one.

Another example of Casement’s progressivism was his support of the Agricultural Experiment Stations, seen by progressive reformers as a way to modernize farms. The stations were operated by agricultural colleges and tested new methods and technologies in an attempt to increase farm output. Experiment stations often rented land from local farmers to conduct research. Once the research was completed, agricultural experts published their findings in bulletins or reports, which were distributed to area farmers and ranchers. In the decade prior to World War I, agricultural experts from Kansas State Agricultural College (now Kansas State University) used Casement’s Juniata ranch for research, testing how well different feeds fattened hogs. They also performed a grazing experiment that sought to improve “native pasture land by a deferred and rotation system of grazing” on his land. By offering his ranch for use in agricultural research, Casement worked with progressive reformers in spreading the gospel of farm efficiency.

Although ranching and conservation occupied much of his time, Casement still thought of himself as part of a larger community of social reformers who sought to help the victims of industrialization through the Progressive Party. As a delegate to the 1912 Republican National Convention, Casement witnessed Roosevelt’s dramatic break with the Republican Party and became a committed member of the Progressive (or Bull Moose) Party. Led by Roosevelt, the Progressive Party championed a host of reforms. In 1912 Casement helped to create the Colorado Progressive Party, whose platform condemned big corporate and special interests in the state and supported a “public utilities commission with regulatory and supervisory powers . . . eight hour laws, and a corrupt practices act.” In 1914 many progressives left the Colorado party because it supported a miner’s strike against Colorado Fuel and Ironworks, a Rockefeller-owned mining and steel company. The strike resulted in the famous Ludlow Massacre, in which many strikers and their family members were killed when a tent city caught fire during a tense standoff with the National Guard. After the incident, striking miners ransacked company property and inspired fear throughout southeastern Colorado. Casement, however, continued to support the Progressive Party and its position on labor. The party’s 1914 platform “demanded recognition of labor’s right to organize and bargain collectively,” called for “a constitutional amendment to make coal mining a public utility subject to state regulation of prices and working conditions, and called for an experiment in state ownership and operation of coal mines.” Casement also actively campaigned for the Progressive Party’s candidate for governor, Edward P. Costigan, who served as defense counsel for the striking miners of Ludlow.

Casement not only championed the rights of laborers but also those of women and children. His support of

12. “‘States Rights’ as Viewed by a Practical Stockman.”
women’s suffrage is not surprising because his mother, Frances Casement, was active in the movement and counted Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton among her friends. Casement wrote that the Colorado women’s suffrage amendment, passed in 1893, was a “measure in which I deeply believe.” He even drafted a manuscript in defense of women’s suffrage intended for the Woman’s Journal, but never published it. He was also likely a champion of child labor laws, as indicated by his selection as a delegate to the eleventh annual meeting of the National Child Labor Committee by Governor Ammons. Although it is unknown whether Casement accepted, the nomination itself suggests a reputation for advocating social reforms.

Until World War I, Casement retained a pro–federal government stance on progressivism that focused on structural reforms within the cattle industry, increasing farm efficiency, and various social reforms. After the war, however, he modified his progressive views. He still desired structural reforms for the cattle industry but wanted cooperation between meatpackers, ranchers, and the federal government; he promoted farm efficiency only until he came to believe that it threatened republican virtue; and he remained interested in social and industrial


19. Secretary to the Governor, G. G. Northrup to Casement, December 30, 1914, folder 17, box 6, Casement Papers.
justice but believed these should be achieved through the private sector, not the federal government.

One of the primary reasons Casement modified his progressive ideas was the War Industries Board (WIB). Created by President Woodrow Wilson in July 1917 the WIB was a government agency tasked with mobilizing the nation’s resources for war. The three successive chairmen and most of the board members were corporate executives. The mixture of public and private sectors reflected, in the words of historian Robert D. Cuff, Wilson’s “ideology of liberalism which subsumed both the idea of friendly cooperation between business and government and an ambiguity toward the role of the state.” The executives viewed themselves as engaged in a partnership with the government. They wanted to demonstrate the ability of the private sector to lead the wartime economy, even though they were acting under the auspices of a public organization. The WIB was divided into departments according to function that “addressed price fixing, conservation . . . and priorities,” as well as departments based on commodities such as “steel, chemicals, finished products, and labor.”

These departments allowed businesses involved in a single industry to cooperate under the supervision of the federal government. Cuff further explained that the WIB “operate[d] in a ‘twilight zone’ between public and private institutions, depending greatly on goodwill from both sides.” It was a public institution staffed mostly by businessmen who carried out much of their work outside of the bureaucracy, relying heavily on trade associations. Casement legitimately concluded that the private sector rescued the WIB from failure. Many economists, government officials, and businessmen learned through the WIB that cooperation was superior to individualism; Casement learned too. Those who wanted to apply the WIB model to the peacetime economy, styled “new economists” or “associationalists,” believed that cooperation within industries, led by trade associations, would benefit everyone from CEOs to wage laborers to consumers. According to this plan, the government played an indirect role in the market—disseminating economic information to businesses, protecting American industries from international competition, and overseeing the trade associations. Although the associationalism of the 1920s gave a free hand to business, it nevertheless achieved, or at least appeared to Casement to achieve, some significant progressive goals. Its adherents departed from most progressives in their desire for only indirect federal involvement in the private sector; but associationalists shared with many progressives a desire to increase efficiency as well as to create equal opportunity. They wanted big firms to share economic data with small firms, thus, in theory, ensuring a level playing field. Throughout the 1920s, Casement promoted associationalism within the livestock industry not only for his own profit but also because he believed that the associationalist model fulfilled his progressive ideals.

Casement thought that business leaders learned the value of cooperation for the common good as a result of their WIB experience. He declared that Americans can “hope for the prompt arrival of social and industrial conditions that will be a great improvement over those we have hitherto known,” because of enlightened business leaders. Casement maintained that before the war, titans of industry were greedy, selfish, and ruthlessly competitive. But their experience working for the WIB—for something greater than themselves—made them selfless. He even referred to his old corporate foes as “honest and broad-minded.” Casement explained that the industry leaders who directed the economy under the WIB viewed their ten months of service as “the happiest months of their lives” and that “a sense of duty done . . . could be their only reward.” Casement was probably thinking of the fact that many of the corporate executives who staffed the WIB worked for only a dollar a year and also made efforts to address labor issues.

Seeing the benefits of cooperation, Casement sought an associational relationship between meatpackers and producers. Unfortunately for Casement, most producers distrusted the big meatpacking corporations such as

24. Casement quotation from “Dan Casement of Manhattan Sees Some of Packers Side,” Hutchinson News (KS), February 21, 1919; see also Eisner, Warfare State to Welfare State, 64.
Armour, Swift, and Morris because they had conspired to keep cattle prices low, thus hurting the beef producers. In an attempt to convince livestock producers of cooperation’s value, Casement wrote articles for trade magazines and gave speeches to national and local ranching organizations that extolled the benefits of cooperation with the packers. Certain that the associationalist model would benefit all producers, Casement worked to persuade Kansas ranchers to cooperate with the meatpackers in forming what was in essence a trade association for the cattle industry. Like many other Kansas cattlemen, he had disliked packers before the war. But he had served in an artillery unit in Europe during the war, and he claimed that his unit was always well supplied with quality beef by the meatpackers who operated the beef department of the WIB. As a result, Casement praised the beef department’s great efficiency and patriotism, even going so far as to claim that the packers had become progressives. Referring to the sincerity of a statement made by the head of one of the largest meatpacking operations, Casement explained that “when he asserts that equality of opportunity is of infinitely more importance to this country than the entire packing industry, far be it from me to say that Eddie Morris is a hypocrite because he has begun to preach the doctrine of Theodore Roosevelt.” Casement claimed that the packers only wanted a “square deal,” a reference to Theodore Roosevelt’s earlier reform program. Casement also defended the big meat packers’ monopoly of the industry by arguing that “we should not fear to permit power; we should not destroy it; our only legitimate job is [to] provide that it shall not be abused.” He even went so far as to claim that the producer-packer relationship was based on mutual “dependence,” stating that their “interests are dependent on each other and confidence and friendliness should prevail in our mutual dealings.”

Casement continued to promote cooperation between producers and packers throughout the 1920s. In that decade he was primarily interested in organizing the cattle industry on a voluntary basis, and, in keeping with an associationalist model, he also asked for some level of federal assistance for the cattle industry. Since meat packers had taken advantage of beef producers in the past, Casement supported limited federal regulation. As he stated at the Kansas Live Stock Association convention at Hutchinson in February 1919, “the proper function of government” was “to regulate and control [meatpackers and other big corporations] with fairness.” Furthermore, he claimed that corporations should be “held on the track by honest and intelligent government supervision.”

His work in creating the Casement Report offers an example of cooperation between the public and private sectors in the livestock industry. In 1925 Secretary of Agriculture William M. Jardine appointed Casement to review a proposed grazing-fee increase on Forest Service land. After intense study, he issued what became known as the Casement Report in 1926. In it, he praised the

26. Ibid.
mission of the Forest Service, its expert employees, and the success of its conservation program in regenerating forage. He concluded that the higher rate was justified in theory, but he cautioned against instituting a higher rate in reality because he believed that helping ranchers to profit was part of the Forest Service mission.27

Although Casement favored indirect federal involvement along associationalist principles, he was ready to accept a degree of direct federal intervention if it benefited ranchers. In 1928 Casement attended a meeting of ranchers in Denver that demanded government aid in the form of tariffs. Fearing competition from the fast growing Latin American beef industry, these ranchers demanded increased tariffs on dressed beef, live cattle, canned beef, and hides. Over the course of the meeting, they drafted a proposal and submitted it to the House Ways and Means Committee. The ranchers hoped their proposal would become part of the McNary-Haugen farm relief bill, which called for the federal government to purchase excess crops and hold them off the market in order to boost farm prices. Even though Casement opposed this kind of direct federal intervention, he supported it in this case because the beef industry could benefit from it. In fact, Casement was eager to get measures into the bill that would “work to our advantage,” and he persuaded other

ranchers to accept it.\textsuperscript{28} Although Casement advocated federal assistance when it was profitable for ranchers, he mainly favored voluntary, private sector arrangements.

Just as he did during the Progressive Era, Casement was still combating individualism, inefficiency, and unchecked competition in the cattle industry in the 1920s. Casement’s postwar goal was to organize a trade association for the livestock industry. To this end, he supported the National Live Stock and Meat Board, which represented the cooperative spirit of the day. It consisted of eleven representatives from the producers and two each from the packers, retailers, and commercial agents and mainly acted as a marketing agency. In fact, at the annual convention of the American National Live Stock Association in January 1922, Casement made the initial motion that they accept the National Live Stock and Meat Board. The very next month, passage of the Capper-Volstead bill provided cooperatives with greater legal protection from antimonopoly laws in the interest of “orderly marketing.”\textsuperscript{29} The Meat Board funded research on beef at universities and promoted meat consumption through publications that highlighted the health benefits of meat, such as \textit{Meat for the Family} and \textit{My Meat Recipes}. It even sponsored a “National Meat Story Contest.”\textsuperscript{30} However, by 1928 Casement was not content with marketing alone; he wanted increased contributions from producers and packers to fund more than simply advertising and research. He called for “collective, organized action” in order to increase the profitability of beef and other cattle products. He also desired a lobby for “national beef policy.”\textsuperscript{31}

The following year Casement was part of a five-member committee chaired by rancher and former Wall Street banker Oakleigh Thorne that sought to stabilize the livestock industry by strengthening the National Live Stock and Meat Board. The committee’s plan was “to increase the demand for meat and help stabilize livestock and meat supplies and values.” The committee asked the packers to help stockmen “adjust production to demand, and, when necessary, demand to production. [The packers] should assist in enabling the consumer to know that he is getting the quality of meat he is paying for.” Cattlemen would have to give up some of their individualist spirit and cooperate with packers for the good of the industry.\textsuperscript{32}

On the eve of the New Deal, then, Casement was working to organize the livestock industry through cooperation between producers and meatpackers, create legalized trusts that would reduce competition among meatpackers, and obtain federal assistance for the cattle industry.

Although Casement desired some federal assistance and national organization for the livestock industry, he generally believed that increased efficiency rather than federal assistance was sufficient for farmers. After World War I, crop prices dropped significantly—most by more than half—and did not return to prewar levels throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. Casement’s Juniata ranch reflected state and national trends during the initial years of the farm crisis, showing “a slight loss” in 1919, “a cash loss of $2,000 and an inventory loss of $10,000” the following year, and by 1921 only a “loss of $300 in inventory.”\textsuperscript{33} After 1921 his farm was profitable because, unlike the owners of many smaller farms, Casement had the capital to become more efficient by employing the latest technologies and methods.

Casement wanted his ranch, which he sometimes called a farm, to serve as a model of efficiency that farmers could emulate to survive the farm crisis. “Juniata Farm,” noted the \textit{Kansas City Star}, “is one of the meccas for persons interested in livestock production and a highly developed agricultural plant.” Casement even referred to himself as one of the “progressive breeders.” The \textit{Star} highlighted his “modern methods” in an article that discussed his unique achievement of winning two grand champions at the American Royal Live Stock Show in 1929. The winning “calves were grown under the new practice in beef production—creep feeding,” which was the practice of supplementing a nursing calf’s diet with hay. This method had been introduced in 1926, and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Some Nation-Wide Problems of the Beef Producer, ca. 1928, folder 12, box 20, Casement Papers. Historians usually identify supporters of the McNary-Haugen bills as the progressive farmers of the 1920s. See, for example, Link, “What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920s?”
  \item \textsuperscript{30} National Live Stock and Meat Board, \textit{Meat for the Family} (Chicago, IL: National Live Stock and Meat Board, 1925); National Live Stock and Meat Board, \textit{My Meat Recipes} (Chicago, IL: National Live Stock and Meat Board, 1926), 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Some Nation-Wide Problems of the Beef Producer.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} “A Plan for Increasing the Demand for Meat, and for Helping to Stabilize Livestock Production, Marketing and Values,” ca. 1929, folder 25, box 22, Casement Papers.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Nelson Antrim Crawford, “Typical Farmer Forced to Accept Low Return on Investment, Says Expert,” March 11, 1922, unidentifiable newspaper, folder 2, box 28, Casement Papers.
\end{itemize}
Casement used it by 1928 if not earlier. The _Star_ reporter further noted that his “modern methods also extended to the crop production, corn being handled with tractors, 4-row planters, and cultivators among the newest of labor saving machines.” Casement’s solution of increased efficiency by utilizing modern methods and the latest technology, however, applied only to farmers with some capital, not to dirt farmers.

Casement’s faith in associationalism precluded a farm solution that involved little, if any, federal intervention. Casement therefore vehemently opposed the popular McNary-Haugen Bill for farmers, even though, as mentioned previously, he wanted provisions in the bill that would benefit ranchers. The bill proposed to boost farm prices by creating a federally owned export corporation that would hold excess crops off the domestic market and sell as much of the surplus as possible on the world market. The goal was to remove enough farm products from the domestic market to boost prices. Rather than curtail production, the bill would dump the excess on the world market. Disagreeing with federal purchase of crops, he stated that farmers would benefit more from a tax reduction than the McNary-Haugen Bill. Casement agreed with his friend William Jardine, then president of Kansas State Agricultural College and fellow critic of any government farm subsidy, who claimed that “increasing efficiency on the farm is the only method of relieving the present economic difficulty in our agricultural territory.”

Not surprisingly, Casement later opposed the modest Agricultural Marketing Act (1929) that many conservatives supported. Agricultural historian R. Douglas Hurt explains that according to the marketing plan, the federal government would “help organize and support” various “commodity associations.” The act allowed the state to loan money to cooperatives, which in turn would lend money to individual farmers for financial support while they withheld their crops from the market. One of the main goals of the marketing plan was to avoid “swamping the market” with produce. The Agricultural Marketing Act also created the Federal Farm Board that purchased surplus commodities. Casement considered even this modest amount of government intervention too much. In reference to the Farm Board, he explained that “the government has departed so far from its legitimate functions as to have become a speculative dealer in grain and cotton and a loan agent for numerous organizations with farm affiliations.”

In the 1920s, as in the Progressive Era, Casement advocated for increased farm efficiency. He was also against direct federal intervention in the farm sector. During the Progressive Era, Casement was far more concerned with the cattle industry and the urban victims of industrialization than he was with poor farmers. His unconcern for the plight of the farmers suggests that he was content with the unorganized state of the farm sector as it existed during the Progressive Era.

While Casement primarily focused on questions pertaining to ranching and farming during the Progressive Era, he became increasingly concerned from the domestic market to boost prices. Rather than curtail production, the bill would dump the excess on the world market. Disagreeing with federal purchase of crops, he stated that farmers would benefit more from a tax reduction than the McNary-Haugen Bill. Casement agreed with his friend William Jardine, then president of Kansas State Agricultural College and fellow critic of any government farm subsidy, who claimed that “increasing efficiency on the farm is the only method of relieving the present economic difficulty in our agricultural territory.”

Not surprisingly, Casement later opposed the modest Agricultural Marketing Act (1929) that many conservatives supported. Agricultural historian R. Douglas Hurt explains that according to the marketing plan, the federal government would “help organize and support” various “commodity associations.” The act allowed the state to loan money to cooperatives, which in turn would lend money to individual farmers for financial support while they withheld their crops from the market. One of the main goals of the marketing plan was to avoid “swamping the market” with produce. The Agricultural Marketing Act also created the Federal Farm Board that purchased surplus commodities. Casement considered even this modest amount of government intervention too much. In reference to the Farm Board, he explained that “the government has departed so far from its legitimate functions as to have become a speculative dealer in grain and cotton and a loan agent for numerous organizations with farm affiliations.”

In the 1920s, as in the Progressive Era, Casement advocated for increased farm efficiency. He was also against direct federal intervention in the farm sector. During the Progressive Era, Casement was far more concerned with the cattle industry and the urban victims of industrialization than he was with poor farmers. His unconcern for the plight of the farmers suggests that he was content with the unorganized state of the farm sector as it existed during the Progressive Era.

While Casement primarily focused on questions pertaining to ranching and farming during the Progressive Era, he became increasingly concerned

---


36. _A Solution to the Farm Problem_, April 1931, folder 12, box 20, Casement Papers; Hurt, _Problems of Plenty_, 61–63.
with the nation’s moral direction as American society underwent rapid change in the 1920s. By 1931 Casement believed that conserving republican virtue as symbolized by farmers was more important than increasing farmer efficiency. Many Americans have considered the small, independent family farm as a romantic ideal ever since Thomas Jefferson first described it as a safeguard of democracy and virtue. Casement’s concern over the perceived decline of republican virtue stemmed from anxiety about American culture in the 1920s. The cultural upheaval of the 1920s with flappers, speakeasies, and the loosening of sexual mores disturbed Casement. In 1924, referring to President Calvin Coolidge, Casement stated that “the country needs a double dose of New England puritanism, economy and thrift.” Not surprisingly, he was an outspoken proponent of prohibition. He was also concerned with the increase of socialist activity within the United States—both real and imagined. During the Red Scare of 1919 and 1920 many Americans associated strikes with socialism. While we saw that Casement favored a private sector strike, as in the miners’ strike at Ludlow, he did not want to see public sector strikes. In reference to the Boston police strike of 1919, he stated—according to a local newspaper—that “no man has a right to strike against his country.” 37 Casement also later opposed the New Deal because he claimed it was socialist. In a 1935 letter to Casement, W. I. Drummond, publisher of the New Agricultural Review, wrote, “I agree with you that an

aggressive fight should be made against the socialization or sovietization of American Agriculture.”

The solution, Casement believed, rested with the nation’s farmers. Casement believed that the small farmer, in contrast to flappers and socialists, best exemplified American values, but preserving these values meant maintaining a romanticized nineteenth-century model for farms. He believed that family farms nurtured republican virtue—self-reliance, hard work, personal sacrifice, sobriety, and fortitude. His romantic conception of the farmer is evident when, even in the midst of the Dust Bowl, he wrote that “the real farmer contemplates with patient fortitude the periods of deprivation and low prices which must always be incidental to his calling.” Casement’s ideal farm was neither large nor small but rather one that was self-sufficient and usually provided a modest living. Farming, he claimed, had “made intangible contributions to our social fabric far more important than those material elements of our wealth.” He maintained that the nation benefited from farming as a “way of living” rather than as an “industry.” Although he never put it this way, he may have thought that America benefited from ranching as an “industry” more than as a “way of life.” As he stated, the farmer, “almost alone, still conserves our precious ideal of independence.”

Casement was against large-scale corporate farms for the same reason he was against government assistance to farmers—both, in his opinion, led to the demise of the family farm. In the early 1920s he had told farmers that modernization was the only way to survive economically, but by 1931 he had changed his mind. He proposed that agriculture remain purposefully inefficient and farms purposefully small because these conditions promoted republican virtue. He was fearful of “the advent of the giant farm [which would be] operated on a vast scale and with the precision of Mr. Ford’s Detroit factory.” However, Casement probably did not support breaking up large corporate farms already in existence, given his great respect for private property as well as his desire for limited government. Casement did not want to see a future where “pigs would be produced like pig-iron and with the same efficiency that now attends their slaughter. Milk would almost literally be manufactured like motor cars. Volume would be regulated, costs minimized and prices maintained.” He further stated that “the spiritual returns from cultivating the soil and husbanding animals are far more important than the material product of their business.” His ideas about conserving traditional values are not too far removed from those of modern critics of the welfare system who want to curtail welfare because they believe it makes people dependent on government rather than on individual initiative.

Even though he favored organization for the cattle industry, he opposed it for farmers because he feared it would inhibit what he believed was their independence. Casement feared that large farms that operated like factories turned farming into a business and devalued it as a way of life. He was not in favor of “corporate ownership.” Even though he believed “consolidation, incorporation, and intensive organization” would “maintain prices” and bring stability, if not prosperity to the farmers, he nevertheless opposed them. If farming became prosperous and easy, Casement thought it would cease to foster a strong work ethic. As he put it, “the gain in material prosperity, which might normally be expected to accompany the practice of such modern and efficient methods, would, I believe be counterbalanced by a further decline in our most important national asset, the social sanity and security which is mainly based on that priceless institution, the farm family.” The environment of the small farm, he claimed, “incubates a sound philosophy of life.”

Preserving farm values, however, required more than the right environment. Casement believed it required the right people as well. He thought that strenuous farm life demanded more effort than some contemporary farmers could muster. For him, the answer was to discover especially suited individuals who could withstand the strenuous farm life. Casement explained that these individuals should have “a sound body, special knowledge on many subjects, and above all, an abiding love for the out-of-doors.” These select few would find time for “contemplation” and ample time for sport—“shooting, hunting, and polo.” In 1925 he explained to senior agricultural students at Kansas State Agricultural College

38. W. I. Drummond to Casement, May 18, 1935, folder 16, box 8, Casement Papers.
40. A Solution to the Farm Problem.
41. Ibid. 
42. Extract of a letter from D. D. Casement to H.M.A., 1928, folder 9, box 7, Casement Papers. Emphasis is in the original.
43. Ibid.
44. A Solution to the Farm Problem.
that the farmer needed a classical liberal education because the farmer had time for reflection while performing his or her lonely and mechanical tasks. He explained that “in order to supply this need and thus give to the farmer the best chance to develop a full, well-rounded life, to make him most valuable to himself and his community, I would give him an education in the cultural subjects and the humanities as well as in the agricultural subjects.”

Casement’s attitude toward farmers who asked for government assistance was callous. His solution to the farm problem favored farmers, like himself, with capital and modest-sized farms on good land. Many farmers, however, could not suffer through hard times even if they wanted to. They could not sell enough of their crops to pay taxes, buy food, pay mortgages, pay debts, and buy seed for the next year.

Casement’s romanticized idea of the farmer had much in common with the Progressive Era’s Country Life Movement (CLM), which was composed of urban dwellers who sought to keep farmers on the farms by making them more efficient without sacrificing their republican virtue. According to historian David Danbom, the more nostalgic wing of the CLM believed “that the farmer was socially necessary because of his superior physical, mental, and moral health.” Danbom explained that the CLM viewed the farmer as “the prototypical American, the independent, self-reliant, natural, productive, middle class yeoman, the rock of republican government and the conservator of national morals.”

In the quest for farm efficiency, members of the movement “emphatically endorsed voluntary” efforts through the agricultural extension service over federal intervention. Casement agreed with many members of the CLM in lamenting the loss of traditional farm life and hated to see the “decline of the [rural] family.” Although Casement was not a member of the CLM, he shared its view of the farmer in the late 1920s.

Even though Casement’s attitudes toward farming and farmers were socially conservative, in other matters he remained committed to progressive reforms. In 1932 all Kansas counties struggled financially. When local, state, and private charities failed to keep up with the demand for relief, Casement led a collective relief effort for the needy people of Manhattan. Thus, even as late as 1932 Casement could proudly proclaim that “we strive for social justice.” He explained that social justice “will be a reality when capital shares profits with labor. This should require no legislative decree. A powerful motive no less universal than enlightened selfishness should recommend it to every employer who hankers for true happiness and to every workman with vision enough to detect and resent a racket.”

Aside from making substantial financial contributions to charitable funds for the area poor and giving annual bonus checks to his ranch hands, Casement also chaired the Riley County Red Cross, which actively collected relief for the poor. In one case it sponsored a house-to-house drive by which local women asked homeowners to contribute a day’s worth of earnings for the poor. By January 1933 the drive had collected over $6,000 for unemployment relief.

Casement was also chosen by the Manhattan Chamber of Commerce as the general chairman of its recently

47. Ibid., 128; Sarah T. Phillips, This Land, This Nation: Conservation, Rural America, and the New Deal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 11.
48. Fearon, Kansas in the Great Depression, 1-49.
49. Chamber of Commerce Clippings, Riley County Historical Society, Manhattan, KS, 1932.
created Civic Emergency Committee (CEC), which encouraged and facilitated new construction. It advertised the Depression-induced low cost of construction materials and oversaw a corps of volunteer “minute men” who canvassed area houses asking people to take a “prosperity pledge,” by which a homeowner agreed to spend money on home improvements. The “prosperity pledges” also required people to hire construction workers for capital improvements. As of June 25 pledges totaled roughly $84,000. With this money Casement hoped to provide jobs for the tradesmen and craftsmen of Manhattan. According to one newspaper, Casement “unqualifiedly endorsed the program.”

Casement’s involvement in the CEC illustrates his belief in urban community cooperation for social justice. Equating mass consumption with justice, Casement stated that one who failed to purchase amply was “helping to deprive all these persons and agencies of a living wage.” Casement explained that consumers benefited because a “new suit, a new car, new tires, new furniture give [people] personal satisfaction.” The CEC aided everyone, he claimed; it helped property owners by increasing property value, laborers by providing income, and the entire town by promoting “civic beautification.”

Casement displayed flexibility in his free-market beliefs because he was willing to curtail competition in the interest of what he considered fairness. The CEC aided labor through voluntary, private arrangements that protected laborers from excessive competition by asking “laborers to get together to fix a wage scale for three months.” The organization itself consisted of “representatives of labor, banks, contractors, and retailers” who worked together for the common good of the city. Although Casement rallied the community to help laborers, he did not support the same kind of assistance for farmers.

By the onset of the New Deal, Casement thus had a firm idea about how the country should deal with the Depression: voluntary cooperation for business, labor, and consumers; consolidation for the cattle industry; community support for workers; and hardship and suffering for farmers in order to preserve republican virtue and American identity.

The 1932 election ushered in Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal that sought to end the Depression and provide security for Americans. Casement’s opposition to the New Deal, especially the AAA, is treated at length in the works of James C. Carey and Jean Choate. However, neither historian explains how Casement’s views had changed since the Progressive Era. In 1935 Casement became president of an organization called the Farmers Independence Council (FIC) in order to rally farmers as well as the general public to oppose the AAA and the New Deal.

Although Casement understood the dire situation facing farmers in the early 1930s, he still thought that they

51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
should endure it. After three years of depression, farm commodities were worth only half as much as they had been during the relatively good years of 1910 to 1914. In the Great Plains, severe drought, heat, and insects took their toll on every crop as periodic dust storms moved precious topsoil into homes, lungs, and occasionally all the way into the Atlantic Ocean. Casement explained that “in my state of Kansas the summer of 1934 was simply hell. Nothing ever approached it in terms of scarcity of precipitation” with “dirt storms of a volume and quantity never before known.” However, in spite of being aware of the hardships of farming in the 1930s, Casement still maintained that “the real farmer contemplates with patient fortitude the periods of deprivation and low prices which must always be incidental to his calling.” Therefore, he opposed direct federal intervention on behalf of the farmers.

In contrast, Franklin Roosevelt provided direct federal assistance to farmers through many different programs, but the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) angered Casement the most. The AAA paid farmers of various crops and growers of certain types of livestock who chose to participate in the program to reduce production. In this way, Roosevelt and his advisors sought to increase the price of basic commodities and thereby keep farmers on their farms.

Casement reasoned that the AAA would curtail republican virtue because it rewarded weakness. He explained that the AAA violated the laws of evolution by allowing the “incompetent” and “pitiful and deluded” farmers to survive while punishing “the worthiest and most intelligent part of our rural population.” He also claimed that the AAA removed the burden of self-reliance, condemning any “agency of government” that would “control my individual effort and assume my personal responsibility”—this despite the fact that participation in the program was voluntary. Casement thus believed that his farm solution represented the true progressive position while the AAA was promoted by false progressives who had no concept of hard work owing to their privileged upbringing and lack of “common sense.”

As historian Charles Wood rightly noted, “Casement . . . carefully selected the government interventions upon which he heaped abuse.” Casement directed most of his criticism toward the corn-hog program—an AAA measure—which was not very popular with the American people. Under this program, cooperating farmers reduced their corn crop and pig populations in exchange for a subsidy funded by a processing tax. He also condemned the basic AAA principle of crop reduction. However, he was silent on the issue of farm debt, which was arguably a more serious problem for farmers than low farm prices were because farmers could lose even their food supply due to outstanding debts. He also did not criticize the Farm Credit Administration, which helped farmers pay their debts by refinancing and temporarily reducing interest rates. Indeed the debt issue posed a problem for Casement’s thinking about farmers because many farmers might have been able to withstand the hardships of the drought and depression, but paying their mortgages, taxes, and costs of operation was largely outside their control. It was perhaps more convenient for Casement to stay silent on popular programs.

Because Casement opposed even modest government assistance to farmers, he only reluctantly supported the Republican nominee for president, Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas. The Republican Party platform held that “federal benefits payments” to farmers were acceptable as an “emergency measure” as long as the federal government stayed within its financial means. It also provided for “reasonable benefits” for participation in soil conservation programs. Not surprisingly, Casement was upset that Republicans would “offer the farmer a ‘program’ in exchange for his vote. If the defeat of the New Deal is accomplished at such cost, the victory will be a calamity.” He explained that “the governor of my own state of Kansas, now prominently mentioned for the Republican presidential nomination, recently told me that the farm vote could not be gained save by tossing

56. *Corn-Fed Philosophy*.
60. *Corn-Fed Philosophy*.
to the farmer a golden apple program on a ‘platform of platitudes,’ a policy which he frankly advocated.” Casement even stated that “whichever party may prevail, this contagious susceptibility to collectivism will be spread wide.” In terms of agricultural policy, Casement viewed the Republicans as the lesser of two evils.64

At one point Casement deviated from his advocacy of limited government and advocated parity prices—except in the other direction. He called for an “equitable relation between agricultural and industrial prices” by adjusting industrial wages and prices to agricultural production. In his system, wages and prices would continually fluctuate according to the price of commodities. Casement reasoned that since food was the first need of humanity, it was the most important social need, and therefore all other prices should be set according to it rather than vice versa. He did not explain how exactly industrial wages would be made variable, but presumably government oversight would be necessary.65

Casement must have believed that the “real” farmers would turn out in droves to save the country from what he considered the socialistic New Deal in 1936. He was anti-Roosevelt and anti-farm assistance much more than

---

64. Quotation in Casement, “The Predicament of Agriculture,” 43; Morse to Casement, June 29, 1936, folder 6, box 10, and Morse to Casement, July 2, 1936, folder 7, box 10, Casement Papers. Morse’s replies to Casement make it clear that Casement strongly disagreed with the Republican platform.

he was pro-Landon. Casement equated Roosevelt with communism and presumably believed that at least the Republican candidate was a better choice. He held out hope, even though FIC membership numbers suggested that this hope was in vain (they counted only 400 members in 1936). When Roosevelt won a landslide victory that November—winning the farm-state vote handily—Casement became disillusioned with the country and its people and gradually abandoned his Progressive Era beliefs. He was disenchanted with social and industrial justice and was convinced that for human behavior, heredity was more deterministic than environment.

Franklin Roosevelt’s landslide reelection proved to Casement that most Americans had repudiated republican virtue. As president of the FIC, Casement no doubt agreed with FIC executive vice president Stanley Morse’s letter to members on the meaning of Roosevelt’s reelection. Morse was dismayed “that there are so many people in the United States who have become so mentally and morally demoralized that they can be bamboozled, browbeaten, and bought to re-elect the un-American New Deal.” Americans were demoralized, he explained, because their “moral fibre has been degenerated by prosperity and soft living” and that they “lack the courage and manhood to meet disaster bravely, [and] hence, turn to their government for help.” Morse maintained that America needed “regeneration by suffering,” meaning that hard times would restore republican virtue. The “law of nature,” Morse explained, “develops strong character and a virile people by making them undergo hardships.” According to Morse and Casement, the American people needed a “period of suffering.”

Suffering notwithstanding, Casement believed that recovering America’s republican virtue was impossible and repudiated his progressive goals. In a 1938 letter to famed Emporia journalist William Allen White, he bemoaned that social and industrial justice—the kind he and White had championed during the Progressive Era—only led to “hopeless efforts to rehabilitate biological derelicts.” In other words, the victims of industrialization were, in some way, inferior to other people. Two years later, in a letter to Morse, he blamed the reelection of Roosevelt on “the majority of the people [who] are too moronic and debauched to want to be saved.” Casement believed American character had fundamentally changed for the worse and feared that the welfare state would lead to the destruction of “our freedom, our property and our lives.”

American acceptance of the New Deal shattered Casement’s faith in his countrymen, causing him to alter his Progressive Era beliefs. For example, Casement had previously interpreted the Constitution loosely. In 1911 he stated that “the [founding] Fathers by no means finished the job and that there is abundant work for us to do.” He then compared the work of the founders to inventions that require continuous updating, concluding, “How quickly then must even the wisest kind of legislation be outstripped and made obsolete by the constant growth and change that is a natural and inevitable law.” By the mid-1930s, however, he believed the contrary. He now claimed that the Constitution should not be changed “to suit the circumstances of modern life” because it was based on “man’s inherent nature” which, being based on man’s biology, cannot change. This shift represented Casement’s disillusionment with Americans. He had also previously supposed that all Americans shared a faith in republican virtue and so was willing to see the Constitution amended in the interest of fairness. However, once he lost faith in Americans, he held the Constitution up as something almost sacred, stating that it “applies to our lives today with the same truth and force that it held for its authors and their contemporaries.” Casement thus came to adhere to a strict constructionist view of the Constitution because he wanted to maintain the status quo.

Casement also modified his view of women. During the Progressive Era he wrote that women were not morally different than men. In 1914 he stated that “the women of Colorado are of the same flesh and blood and moral fiber as the men.” It was just as illogical, he intoned, to believe that a woman would “possess moral and mental superiority” to a man as it was to believe the

67. FIC letter to members, November 20, 1936, folder 9, box 10, Casement Papers.
68. Casement to William Allen White, October 3, 1938, folder 26, box 17, Casement Papers; Casement to Morse, November 27, 1940, folder 265, box 4, Stanley Fletcher Morse Papers, South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, SC.
69. “The Grass That Belongs to Us All,” April 1911, folder 6, box 20, Casement Papers.
70. “A Kansas Farmer Surveys the National Scene [1935?],” folder 7, box 20, Casement Papers.
opposite. However, by the mid-1930s he espoused a view that suggested he placed women on a pedestal. Relying on the vote of women to unseat Roosevelt, he claimed that women had a “truer sense of patriotism than men.”71 Because women apparently failed to prevent the reelection of the president, Casement became disillusioned with them, too. Speaking about amendments a few years later, he stated that “it were better in my opinion if the . . . 19th had never been passed.”72 This represents another repudiation of his Progressive Era beliefs rooted in the idea that Americans in general, and in this case women specifically, would choose republican virtue over the welfare state. Rather than place hope in the future, Casement looked to an idealized past for solving social problems.

Casement had lost faith in the farm environment to shape individuals and instead began to believe that heredity played a greater role in determining who was virtuous and who was not. In a 1939 interview he claimed that a certain family he knew was “one great old American family which has not run out,” meaning that they still practiced republican virtue. The interviewer, continuing with the theme, explained that “Dan Casement, who has the good fortune to be well bred, believes that the effectiveness of any man may be traced, as with animals, back through environment into the intricacies of his breeding. But he is only interested in the heredity of sound health and sound tendencies . . . . Illustrious ancestors and pedigrees that have run out have no appeal to this cattleman who builds ideas into living flesh and blood.”73 Casement’s thinking resembled the eugenics movement, which was popular in Kansas and the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. Eugenics was the idea that society could be improved by ridding it of so called unfit people and promoting the reproduction of those whom eugenicists considered fit. A testament to the movement’s popularity in Kansas is demonstrated by the annual “Fitter Families for Future Firesides” contest held at the State Fair in Topeka throughout the 1920s. In this contest, families were judged on a number of characteristics and rated on their fitness.74 Casement’s new version of republican virtue now existed only in a minority of good bloodlines, with no telling when those would “run out.” Although Casement could not preserve good human bloodlines that exemplified his conception of American identity, he could do so for an animal that

71. Corn-Fed Philosophy; Casement to Blackwell.
72. Dan Casement, “The Real Danger,” address to Army Officer Candidate School graduates at Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 15, 1951, folder 17, box 21, Casement Papers.
exemplified American identity: the American quarter horse. Casement was one of the founding members of the American Quarter Horse Association (AQHA), and in an address to the American National Live Stock Association (ANLSA) in Fort Worth, Texas, in 1942 he explained the purpose of the AQHA. In the speech he blurred human and animal. Referring to a rancher of “English berth [sic] and breeding,” he lauded horse and rider alike, stating that “almost equally with the great race of men who rode him this horse should share the glory of subduing the west to the uses of civilization.” Moreover, he stated that the AQHA should encourage the “preservation of the blood of the true Quarter horse in a maximum state of purity. Fortunately, the prepotency of that blood has so firmly fixed its dominant qualities in all true descendants of the strain that its presence is always unmistakable.”


The Cattleman magazine printed Casement’s address but left out some passages that appeared in Casement’s original copy. In the original he stated that “in horses, as in humans, character and personality are the foundations which underlie all exceptional ability. These are the outgrowth of heredity and environment.” He went on to insist that “the reason, like all truth, has a biologic basis.”


Hence, he would preserve a symbol of nineteenth-century America in the quarter horse. This equine represented the true American identity, which was based on nineteenth-century republican virtue, and the creation of the AQHA was in some way an outgrowth of his desire for moral uplift. The horse served as a kind of proxy for Casement’s conception of the best Americans. Although ideally Casement may have wished to preserve the best humans, he settled for preserving what he considered the best horse. Casement continued to champion republican virtue and condemn communism until his death in 1953.

Casement’s progressivism was defined by a desire for social and industrial justice only insofar as those reforms did not alter American identity as he understood it—an identity based on republican virtue. During the Progressive Era he was willing to curtail the precepts of laissez-faire in the interest of fairness. After World War I Casement modified, but did not fundamentally change, his Progressive Era beliefs. He was convinced that big business was more capable than the federal government of bringing about social and industrial justice because he thought big business owners had become enlightened based on their service in the WIB. His faith in big business, combined with his desire to make ranching profitable, led him to promote a government-business partnership for the cattle industry. Inconsistently, he did not want the federal government to regulate or assist any other industry.

Casement wanted the agricultural landscape populated by family farms of modest size with men and women who could face droughts and recessions with stoic fortitude. To this end, Casement wanted farms to be efficient, but not to the point of turning the farm into a large-scale factory specializing in one or two crops. He wanted to exchange what he considered weak farmers—those who wanted federal assistance—for more robust people who valued their independence. In this way, he probably hoped, the farm sector would be a great gene pool of republican virtue. His involvement with the CEC demonstrated that he still maintained a belief in social and industrial justice even to the extent of modifying laissez-faire principles. However, nothing in the New Deal aroused Casement’s ire like the AAA because it threatened to destroy the republican virtue of the farmers.

Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s Casement still considered himself to be a progressive, which helps to clarify his prewar progressive beliefs. When he called for structural reforms in the Progressive Era, he meant only for them to modify the existing political, economic, and social structure as far as was necessary for fairness. He assumed that American identity would always be founded on republican virtue. His opposition to the New Deal was almost entirely based on opposition to the AAA, which illustrates that he ultimately placed American identity above his own desire for profit in the livestock industry. The reelection of Roosevelt in 1936 caused Casement to lose faith in his fellow Americans, to believe that republican virtue was a product of heredity rather than environment, and, in the end, to renounce much of his progressive past. Yet, believing he was following in the footsteps of Theodore Roosevelt, he continued to denounce Franklin Roosevelt and what he considered “modern liberalism.”

77. Corn-Fed Philosophy.

The Political Journey of Dan Casement 113