A water color by Samuel Reader in 1865 showing members of the Second regiment, Kansas State Militia, as prisoners of war of Gen. Sterling "Pap" Price's Confederate army in the famed Price Raid of October, 1864.
The "Second Kansas State Militia Invading Missouri," Reader captioned this water color, then finished in verse:

With grub and baggage, flag and gun—
The State line no obstruction—
The forward movement has begun,
To compass 'Pop's' destruction.

"Yes, I Surrender," said Reader, and this time he did not resort to verse. Reader was captured by the Confederate forces but soon escaped. These water colors are from the Samuel J. Reader collection in the Kansas State Historical Society.
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War and Politics: The Price Raid of 1864

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The people of Kansas early in the fall of 1864 probably felt more secure than at any time since the beginning of the war. To the south, the Confederate Trans-Mississippi armies were deep in Arkansas and Texas. To the east, Quantrill’s bushwhackers had been forced by Order No. 11 into central Missouri where they no longer threatened the border. Only in the west did the Plains Indians continue to disturb the outer fringe of settlements, but they did not constitute a serious menace to the state as a whole. Consequently, Kansans were inclined to regard the war as being practically over so far as they were directly concerned. Aside from the usual subjects of crops and the weather, their chief interest was the forthcoming state election.

This election was being contested by the rival Republican factions of Sen. James H. Lane of Lawrence and Gov. Thomas Carney of Leavenworth; the Democrats, a hapless and persecuted minority, had found it “inexpedient” to nominate candidates of their own. Governor Carney, a rich wholesale merchant, owed his office to Lane’s influence, but had quarreled with him over patronage matters, and now desired to supplant him as senator. Lane, for his part, was desperately resolved to secure re-election and so maintain his long-held domination of state politics. Under the name of “The Union Party,” the Lane Republicans met at Topeka on September 8 and nominated Col. Samuel J. Crawford of Garnett for governor and Sidney Clarke of Lawrence for congressman. Five days later the Carney wing, calling itself “The Regular Republican Union Party,” likewise assembled in Topeka and named a slate

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1. Order No. 11, issued by the Union military authorities on August 25, 1863, required all the inhabitants of the Missouri border counties of Jackson, Cass, and Bates, with the exception of those living in certain specified towns, to evacuate their homes by September 9. The order was occasioned by the Lawrence massacre of August 21, 1863, and was intended to deprive Quantrill’s guerrillas of the support of the population of the area.

2. The above descriptions concerning the attitude of Kansans in the fall of 1864 are based on a study of the surviving newspapers, journals, and letters of the period.

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headed by Judge Solon O. Thacher of Lawrence and Gen. Albert L. Lee of Doniphan county. A victory by the Union party would mean Lane’s re-election when the legislature convened in January, whereas a Thacher-Lee success would result in the legislature electing Carney.

In the fierce campaign which followed, Lane enjoyed the powerful advantages of President Lincoln’s support and of control of the regular state Republican organization. However, he had accumulated many influential enemies during his stormy career, was blamed in some quarters for unpopular military and railroad policies, and had alienated Leavenworth, then the state’s most populous town, because Rep. A. Carter Wilder of that city had not been renominated for congress. As the election drew near, the Carney faction was confident of victory, while Lane was so despondent over his prospects that a friend found him suffering from “appalling” melancholy, even “aberration of mind.”

Before the election could take place, however, the political situation was radically altered by a series of military events over which neither Lane nor Carney had any control, but which were to be very helpful to the former and extremely harmful to the latter. On September 19, a Confederate army of 12,000, mostly cavalry, marched northward into Missouri. In command was Maj. Gen. Sterling Price, a former governor of that state. With him were the hard-riding Missourians of Gens. Jo Shelby and John Marmduke, and the Arkansas troops of Gen. James Fagan. Price was determined to make one final effort for the Confederate cause in Missouri. He planned to strike at St. Louis and Jefferson City, march up the Missouri river to Kansas City, and withdraw southward by way of Kansas and the Indian territory. Recruits, plunder, and the encouragement of Confederate adherents were his main objectives.

Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, federal commander of Missouri, had been aware for some time of Price’s intentions, but had relied on the Union forces of Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele in Arkansas to contain the Confederates. Steele, however, had remained behind the fortifications of Little Rock and had done nothing to

halt Price. This failure left Rosecrans in an extremely perilous situation. His army of about 17,000 men was scattered throughout Missouri fighting guerrillas, and a large portion of it consisted of militia and recruits. As soon as he learned that Price had evaded Steele he began hurriedly concentrating all available troops, and at the same time obtained permission to use Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith's veteran infantry corps, then at Cairo, Ill., en route to Sherman's army.

Definite information as to Price's movements was lacking, and Rosecrans at first thought that his destination was western Missouri. Therefore, when he received word on September 24 that Shelby was near Pilot Knob, in the southeastern corner of the state, he ordered Brig. Gen. Thomas Ewing, Jr., to go there and ascertain whether Price was moving in that direction. If so, Ewing was to delay him as long as possible in order to gain additional time for strengthening the defenses of St. Louis.6

Ewing arrived at Pilot Knob on September 26 and on the following day was attacked by Price. Although the Confederates heavily outnumbered his garrison, Ewing beat off the assault and retained possession of the fort. However, he lost nearly one fourth of his command, and realized that another Confederate attempt would be successful. Hence, under cover of night, he evacuated the fort and slipped away to the northwest. By this gallant stand at Pilot Knob, called by one writer "The Thermopylae of the West," Ewing accomplished his mission of developing Price's plans and delaying his advance. Moreover, he inflicted heavy casualties on Price's army, blunting its fighting edge for the remainder of the campaign.7

Price merely demonstrated against St. Louis and Jefferson City, as both towns were now too heavily garrisoned to be attacked successfully. On October 10 he reached Boonville, on the Missouri river, where he remained nearly four days. During this period 1,200 to 1,500 Missourians, including Bill Anderson's bushwhackers, joined his army. He also sent orders to Quantrill to raid the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, but Quantrill did not receive the orders and took no part in the campaign. On October 13, after a skirmish with the advance elements of Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton's cavalry division, which had been sent by Rosecrans in pursuit of the Confederates, Price left Boonville and headed west toward Kansas.8

The commander of the Department of Kansas was Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis. A West Point graduate, amiable and likable, he had commanded the victorious Union forces at the important battle of Pea Ridge, Ark., fought in March, 1862. Later on, however, he had become so deeply involved on the radical side in the factional politics of Missouri that Lincoln was forced to remove him from the command in that state. He owed his present post to the influence of Lane and other Western radicals, and to the personal friendship of the President.9

Curtis first received word on September 13 when he was at a camp on the Solomon river, where he had gone to supervise operations against the Indians, that Price had crossed the Arkansas river and possibly would invade Kansas. With less than 4,000 regular troops under his command, he realized that if Price did attempt to enter the state he would have to rely largely on the militia to stop him. Therefore he hurried to Fort Leavenworth and on September 20 requested Governor Carney to alert the militia. Carney replied that he would do so, but indicated an unwillingness to have the militia serve in the field. Curtis thereupon assured him that if at all possible the militia would be employed solely in garrison duty.

For a while Curtis was under a misconception as to Price’s movements. Initially he thought that Price was in the vicinity of Fort Gibson, in the Indian territory. Then a dispatch from Fort Scott caused him to believe that Price was at Cane Hill, Ark., advancing from there on southern Kansas. Not until September 29 did he receive positive information in the form of a telegram from Rosecrans telling him of the battle of Pilot Knob and stating that “the question of Price’s being in Missouri is settled.” Even then he was unsure whether Price would march toward Kansas, but when a report arrived on October 5 that the Confederates were 15 miles below Jefferson City he concluded that the danger was real, and asked Carney to call out the entire state militia.10

At this juncture Curtis encountered serious opposition from the governor. Carney, like many other Kansans, believed it unlikely that Price would invade the state. Moreover, also like many other Kansans, in particular those of the anti-Lane faction, he regarded Curtis as being the mere tool of Lane. Consequently he suspected that Curtis’ intention to mobilize the militia was simply a political trick cooked up by Lane, with the purpose of taking and keeping the voters away from their homes and the polls until after election.

day, thus either preventing an election or making it possible for the Lane faction to win it. On the very day that Carney received the request from Curtis to order out the militia, his newspaper organ, the Leavenworth Times, openly voiced this suspicion, while on the following day Sol Miller, anti-Lane editor of the White Cloud Kansas Chief, proclaimed:

People of Kansas, do you know that Gen. Curtis has entered into a conspiracy with Lane, to call out the entire Kansas Militia, to compel their absence at election time? It is the only hope Lane has of succeeding. They admit that the danger is remote, but are determined to make Price’s movements a pretext for taking the voters away into Missouri, or from their homes.

Past political tricks by Lane, and his unscrupulous reputation, made it easy for his opponents to believe that he was capable of anything, even this. Therefore, instead of complying with Curtis’ request, Carney asked that the call be deferred pending the receipt of more information regarding Price’s movements. He also suggested that the western counties of the state share more of the burden of supplying the militia, since the border ones had been called on many times before, the interior ones hardly at all. Inasmuch as Carney’s political strength lay in the eastern, Lane’s in the western, counties, the possible ulterior motive behind this proposal is obvious.

Carney’s reluctance to order out the militia was intensified when on October 8 Maj. Gen. James G. Blunt arrived in Leavenworth to replace Maj. Gen. George Sykes as commander of the District of Southern Kansas. Blunt was the military and political henchman of Lane, and Carney correctly believed that Sykes’ removal was made by Curtis at the prompting of Lane, who wanted Blunt to be in a position to control the Kansas troops and militia. Furthermore, Carney and Blunt were bitter personal enemies. But on October 9 word came from Rosecrans that Price had left the Jefferson City area and was moving westward in the direction of Leavenworth. This left Carney little choice except to issue a proclamation calling the militia into “the tented field until the rebel foe shall be

11. On one occasion Lane allegedly gained control of a Free-State convention by falsely reporting that the Proslavery party was attacking Free-State settlers.—George W. Brown, Reminiscences of Gen. R. J. Walker, With the True Story of the Rescue of Kansas From Slavery (Rockford, Ill., 1902), pp. 129-131. On another occasion, his supporters are said to have attempted to prevent the state legislature from voting on a matter to which he was opposed by falsely reporting that Quantrill was about to attack Topeka.—See Troy Kansas Chief, February 7, 1863; House Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Kansas, 1864, pp. 297, 298.


baffled and beaten back.” At the same time Curtis placed the state under martial law and directed “all men, white or black, between the ages of eighteen and sixty,” to join some military organization.15

Intense excitement now gripped the state. Rumors circulated that Price was already above Kansas City. In Lawrence an accidental discharge of firearms created a near panic. At Leavenworth the sound of bells ringing and cannon firing to summon a citizens’ defense rally caused “wild anxiety” as the townspeople thought that the rebels were upon them. All business halted throughout the state, and every man capable of bearing arms marched or rode in wagons to the threatened border. Those who remained behind, the very young and the extremely old, organized home guard units.16

Carney placed Gen. George Deitzler in command of the militia. Deitzler’s “staff” consisted exclusively of prominent anti-Lane politicians: Gubernatorial Candidate Solon Thacher, Charles Robinson, D. W. Wilder, John Ingalls, and Mark Parrott. At first the militia concentrated at Olathe, but when the water supply proved inadequate, moved on to Shawneeetown. By October 16 about 10,000 militiamen were assembled near the border, with another 2,600 stationed at interior points. Nearly all the militia were poorly equipped and armed, and badly deficient in training and discipline. Their only uniform was a red badge pinned to their hats.

Curtis divided his forces, which he entitled “The Army of the Border,” into two divisions. The first he assigned to Blunt, who organized it into three brigades under Cols. Charles Jennison, Thomas Moonlight, and Charles Blair. Blunt advanced his division to Hickman Mills, Mo., on October 14, where it formed the right wing of Curtis’ army. The other division, composed entirely of militia, was commanded by Deitzler and constituted the left wing. In all, Curtis had approximately 14,000 men in the field. His plan was to make a first stand along the Big Blue river in Missouri, then in front of Kansas City, and finally, if overpowered, at Wyandotte. Accordingly he had field works constructed at all these places by colored troops and civilian volunteers.17

Day after day passed, however, without any sign of Price’s army

or authentic news as to its location and movements. A great many Kansans decided that Price was not coming or had retreated south, and that there was no actual peril of invasion.\textsuperscript{18} In particular the suspicions of the anti-Lane men became rearoused, and by October 15 they were almost convinced that the mobilization of the militia was a political trick of the wily senator after all. The pro-Carney Oskaloosa \textit{Independent} of that date expressed this view, and on the following day ex-Gov. Charles Robinson, Lane's archenemy, wrote his wife from Shawneeetown that:

It is beginning to be thought that our being called out is all a sham & trick of Lane & Curtis's to make political capital. We cannot hear anything of importance as to the movements of Price. We think that we are kept in ignorance of the true condition of affairs in order to keep the people out as long as possible. Steps are being taken to ascertain all the facts. I have no doubt Price has gone South & that there are only a few guerrillas prowling about. Nobody thinks we shall have anything to do but go home in a few days & attend to our business.\textsuperscript{19}

At Hickman Mills on October 16 a serious disturbance occurred among the militia in Blunt's division. Lt. Col. James D. Snoddy, a pro-Carney newspaper editor from Mound City, asked Blunt to permit his regiment to return to Linn county. Blunt of course refused, whereupon Snoddy started to march home anyway. Backed by another regiment, Blunt personally blocked the attempted desertion and placed Snoddy and Brig. Gen. William H. Fishback of the militia, who was also involved in the mutiny, under arrest. Blunt's action, however, did not prevent numerous desertions by the militia several days later when his division moved to the Big Blue.\textsuperscript{20}

The Leavenworth \textit{Times}, the Lawrence \textit{Journal}, and other anti-Lane papers soon began declaring that Price was no longer in Missouri and that the campaign against him was "an egregious humbug."\textsuperscript{21} Carney adherents circulated copies of these publications among the militia, who increasingly manifested a desire "to go home and attend to their fall plowing." Many of the militia regiments

\textsuperscript{18} O, E. Learnard to Mrs. Learnard, October 15, 1864, "Oscar Eugene Learnard Collection," University of Kansas, v. 4 (Learnard was on the staff of Deitzler); Cordley, op. cit., pp. 245, 246. The telegraph lines east of Leavenworth were broken on October 7.—Leavenworth \textit{Daily Conscription}, October 8, 1864.

\textsuperscript{19} Charles Robinson to Mrs. Robinson, October 16, 1864, "Robinson Papers." A week previously Robinson had been sure that Price was coming toward Kansas.—See Robinson to Mrs. Robinson, October 9, 1864, \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Official Records, Series I, v. 41, pt. 1}, pp. 572, 619, 620; pt. 4, pp. 18, 22, 25, 57, 58, 94, 97; Hinton, op. cit., pp. 65, 68. Fishback, who was also a pro-Carney politician, apologized for his part in the mutiny, and was restored to duty.

\textsuperscript{21} Leavenworth \textit{Daily Times}, October 18, 19, 1864; White Cloud \textit{Kansas Chief}, October 13, 20, 1864; Oskaloosa \textit{Independent}, October 22, 1864. The Western Journal of Commerce, Kansas City, Mo., October 22, 1864, stated that the general opinion was that Price had gone south. On this very date he was well within the present city limits of Kansas City, Mo.
refused to cross the state line into Missouri, or if they did so, to go any distance. Deitzler, who believed that Price was south of the Arkansas river and had so told his troops, supported them in their refusal. The Leavenworth militia in particular were recalcitrant. On October 19 they burned Lane in effigy and paraded a jackass with Blunt’s name on it through the camp at Shawneetown. And when, on the following day, they were ordered to march into Missouri, over one half of them went back to Leavenworth. Political speeches at the Shawneetown camp by Lane and Blunt did not improve matters.22

By October 20, Carney had about decided that the danger of an invasion had ceased to exist, if in fact it had ever existed. He therefore asked Curtis to revoke martial law and, according to a subsequent charge by his opponents, prepared a proclamation disbanding the militia.23 The Leavenworth Times of that date, in an editorial captioned “How Much Longer,” also demanded that martial law be lifted, and declared that the militia should be permitted to go home. But at this juncture, before a real crisis involving the militia could develop, definite news as to Price’s whereabouts at last arrived. An advance detachment of Blunt’s division had encountered Shelby at Lexington, Mo., on the 19th. Heavy skirmishing had followed, with Lane in person participating with a carbine. Blunt immediately reported the action, and slowly fell back toward Independence, Mo. There was no longer any doubt, even among the most skeptical Carney supporters, that Price was coming.24

Blunt continued to retreat before the advancing squadrons of Shelby until he arrived, on the morning of October 20, at the Little Blue, nine miles east of Independence. He decided that this stream would be the best place to make a stand against the enemy, and hence called on Curtis to send him reinforcements. Curtis, however, refused to abandon his plan of fighting the main battle at the Big Blue. Carney and the militia generals were unalterably opposed to having the state troops serve more than a few miles beyond the Kansas border, and he believed that in choosing a battle line it was necessary “to have united councils as well as a strong position.” Therefore he ordered Blunt to conduct only a delaying action at the Little Blue with Moonlight’s brigade.


At noon on the 21st, Marmaduke's division appeared and endeavored to force its way across the bridge that spanned the Little Blue. Moonlight's troops were strongly posted behind stone walls overlooking the river and were armed with repeating rifles and a battery of howitzers. They held off the Confederates for several hours, and finally Price had to bring up Shelby's division to assist Marmaduke. This added pressure was too much, and Moonlight was obliged to give way. He retreated in good order through Independence and on to the Big Blue. The Confederates followed only as far as Independence, where they went into camp for the night.25

Curtis now had his entire army, including the militia, in position behind trenches and barricades along the Big Blue. He hoped to hold Price at this line until Pleasonton could close up from the rear and destroy him. But when Price attacked at midday on October 22 he broke through the Union defenses with ease. Shelby crossed the river above and below Byram's Ford and turned the right flank of the Army of the Border, forcing it to fall back northward to Westport. Several regiments of raw militia tried to stem Shelby's advance on the prairies south of Westport, only to be ridden down and captured "en masse." According to Confederate sources Shelby could have kept on going, but withdrew on his own accord with the approach of darkness. Federal accounts, on the other hand, state that Curtis' troops rallied and drove Shelby back, after which they voluntarily retired again to Westport.26

Meanwhile, to the east, Pleasonton's cavalry division was over a day's march behind the Confederates, not having reached Lexington until the morning of October 21. Pleasonton was ignorant of Curtis' plans and movements and feared that the Kansas troops were not yet ready or able to co-operate effectively with his force. But on the night of October 21 Daniel Boutwell, a volunteer scout from Curtis' army, contacted Pleasonton after a daring journey through guerrilla infested country and told him that Curtis was preparing to withstand Price on the Big Blue. Upon receiving this information Pleasonton quickened his pursuit. At four P.M., October 22, he

reached Independence, where he engaged Price’s rearguard under Marmaduke. By nightfall he had driven Marmaduke to the Big Blue and inflicted heavy losses on his division.27

Messages from Pleasanton saying that he had closed up with Price reached Curtis and Blunt at sundown—the first intelligence they had received in three days of his movements. Yet, notwithstanding this heartening news, Curtis ordered Blunt’s division to fall back to Kansas City. But Blunt countermanded the order and backed by Lane, Samuel J. Crawford, and other members of Curtis’ staff, persuaded Curtis to retain the army in front of Westport.28 During the night Curtis and Blunt withdrew Deitzler’s militia from the northern portion of the front and placed them in the trenches south of Kansas City as a reserve. Large numbers of the militia discovered a “peculiar attraction” in the north side of the Kansas river, and the staff officers had to threaten, then plead, to keep them in line.

The morning of Sunday, October 23, dawned clear and cold. On the prairie in front of Westport both Blunt and Shelby advanced to attack. At first the battle went in favor of Shelby, as his men forced Blunt almost into the streets of Westport. Shelby, however, was fighting only to cover the retreat of the rest of Price’s army. Up to this point, he later declared, the campaign had been a “walkover,” but now the Confederates were in danger of being surrounded. Hence Price’s only desire now was to escape to the south with his immense train of plunder.

At this juncture disaster struck the rear of the Confederate army. Price had assigned Marmaduke’s division to protect the train, which he had sent off to the southwest along the Fort Scott road. Marmaduke endeavored to prevent Pleasanton from crossing the Big Blue at Byram’s Ford, but a savage onslaught by Pleasanton drove him back. Price, fearful for the safety of his train, ordered Shelby to come to Marmaduke’s assistance. But as Shelby started to do so the Union forces at Westport, heavily reinforced with militia, counterattacked. Soon Shelby was not only withdrawing to aid Marmaduke, but was being driven back by Curtis and Blunt. Pleasanton’s troopers intercepted him, and his men had to fight

28. Blunt, “Civil War Experiences,” loc. cit., pp. 253, 259; Moonlight, letter on the Price raid, loc. cit.; Crawford, op. cit., pp. 149-150. Crawford asserts that Curtis wanted to retreat all the way back to Leavenworth, that he abandoned this intention only when the staff officers threatened to depose him and put Blunt in command. This is undoubtedly greatly exaggerated. Blunt, who had little respect for Curtis, does not mention any such threat in his account, and states that Curtis wished to fall back only as far as Kansas City, which would have been in accordance with his original plan.
their way through the Union lines. They then retreated till they caught up with the remainder of Price's army, now in full flight to the south.29

Blunt and Curtis pushed on till they met Pleasonton at a farm house ten miles south of Westport. The generals held a conference and determined to pursue Price in order both to destroy him and protect southern Kansas. Pleasonton, however, wanted to return to Missouri. He maintained that Curtis had enough men to take care of Price, whereas his horses and soldiers were exhausted from 30 days of constant marching. Carney and Deitzler, who were also present, objected. They argued that the Kansas militia should be allowed to go home first. Curtis and Blunt supported this view, and Pleasonton finally acquiesced. Curtis then rescinded martial law in northern Kansas and ordered the militia from that area mustered out. He retained the militia from southern Kansas since that section was still threatened. These matters settled, the conference ended, and the combined forces of Curtis and Pleasonton continued on to Little Santa Fe (ten miles south of Westport in Johnson county, Kansas), where they encamped for the night.30

At sunrise on October 24 the Union forces were on the march. Curtis was in command, with Blunt's division in advance and Pleasonton's following. A separate column under Moonlight moved parallel to Price's right flank in order to prevent him from raiding Mound City and Fort Scott. Price had retreated all night, but was less than five miles ahead. The country along the line of march was entirely desolate. Here and there were the stark chimneys of burnt houses—called by Missourians "Jennison's monuments," in reference to the border raids allegedly perpetrated by Kansas Jayhawkers led by that commander. The road was littered with broken wagons, caissons, rifles, blankets, bits of harness, and other debris. The Union troops captured many Confederates who had fallen by the roadside, sick, wounded, or exhausted.

The day's march ended near Trading Post, Kan. The advance guard found the body of an elderly preacher lying in a field, shot by some of Price's men. His family was "frantic and crazed with terror and grief," his cabin plundered and afire. A dead horse had been dumped into the well. The Confederates had robbed and


murdered three other settlers in the neighborhood and shot at several more. These and other atrocities were probably committed by Shelby's Missourians, in whose ranks were numerous bushwhackers. Shelby's chief of staff, Maj. John N. Edwards, wrote a few years later:

Shelby was soothing the wounds of Missouri by stabbing the breast of Kansas. . . . He was fighting the devil with fire and smoking him to death. Haystacks, houses, barns, produce, crops, and farming implements were consumed before the march of his squadrons, and what the flames spared the bullet finished. . . . If the crows could not fly over the valleys of the Shenandoah without carrying rations, the buzzards of the prairies had no need of haversacks. . . .

During the day the Union forces had gained ground on Price and were within striking distance. Blunt, "with great pertinacity," urged Curtis to move around Price's western flank so as to block his retreat, thereby compelling him to fight or surrender. Curtis, however, thought that this plan was impracticable and rejected it. He then proceeded to waste several hours shifting Pleasonton's division to the front. At daybreak Sanborn's brigade of Pleasonton's division attacked the Confederates in their camp south of Trading Post. They offered little resistance but simply resumed their retreat, departing in great haste and leaving behind cattle, captured Negroes, and partially cooked provisions. They attempted a stand at the ford of the Marais des Cygnes, only to abandon the position quickly when Sanborn again charged their line.

Price continued to retreat until he reached Mine creek. Here he was forced to halt, for his train had become bogged down in the ford and blocked the crossing. In order to save the train he turned back with Fagan's and Marmaduke's divisions and prepared to give battle. But before he could complete his dispositions Pleasonton's troopers were upon him. They thundered across the plain at a gallop and struck Price's lines with a terrific impact. Panic broke out among the Confederates. Men and regiments threw away their guns and fled across Mine creek like a "herd of buffalo." Pleasonton's troops captured over 500 Confederates, including General Marmaduke. Only the timely intervention of Shelby's division, frantically summoned to the front by Price, saved the Confederate army from complete rout and destruction.

Price made another stand two miles north of the Marmaton river. The fighting that followed was neither vigorous nor important.

Only one of Pleasanton's brigades, McNeil's, attacked, and a Confederate countermove nearly flanked it. The rest of Pleasanton's division was strung out over the countryside, badly disorganized, both men and horses exhausted. Blunt's division had failed to catch up with the battle, and could not be expected to come up before nightfall. Consequently Pleasanton turned his division westward to Fort Scott to secure food and rest. Blunt, by some mix-up, did not receive orders sent him by Curtis to keep after Price, but also marched to Fort Scott. As a result Price continued his retreat unpursued.\textsuperscript{33}

Soon after arriving at Fort Scott, Curtis abolished martial law in southern Kansas and relieved the militia of that section from further duty. He felt that the danger to the state was over, and that the regular troops would now be sufficient to dispose of Price. At noon on October 26 his army resumed the pursuit, stopping for the night at Shanghai, Mo. The next day, however, Pleasanton notified Curtis that he was withdrawing himself, one of his brigades, and his artillery from the army. He gave personal illness and the great fatigue of his troops and horses as the reason. Curtis protested, but since the army was now in Missouri, Pleasanton was subject only to the orders of Rosecrans, who telegraphed him permission to do as he desired. Pleasanton left the brigades of Sanborn and McNeil with Curtis. Probably the real reason he departed was because he had quarreled with Curtis over the credit and spoils of the victories at Westport and Mine creek.

Curtis took up the march again and on the morning of October 28 reached Carthage, Mo. Blunt pushed on ahead with his division and came upon the Confederates at Newtonia. Although he had only 1,000 men and was far in advance of the rest of the army, he attacked, in a desperate personal gamble to win the glory of an independent victory. But a Confederate counterattack led by Shelby soon placed Blunt in a perilous situation. His troops, however, held on until Sanborn's brigade arrived. The combined forces of Sanborn and Blunt then forced Price to retreat once more, and that evening the Army of the Border occupied Newtonia.\textsuperscript{34}

Before Curtis could follow Price any farther, Rosecrans, who regarded Curtis as incompetent, ordered Sanborn and McNeil back to their districts in Missouri. This left Curtis with only Blunt's depleted command and therefore with no alternative except to break


off the pursuit. Much disappointed, he was in the course of returning to Kansas when he received instructions from Grant, supreme commander of the Union armies, to keep after Price until he was driven south of the Arkansas river. Backed by this higher authority he countermanded Rosecrans' orders and regained control of 1,800 of Pleasanton's troops. He then turned about and again resumed the pursuit. On November 6, after a march in a snowstorm through the rugged country of northwestern Arkansas, he reached Cane Hill, which had been evacuated by the Confederates two days previously. Two days later his advance guard rode up to the banks of the Arkansas river at Pheasant Ford, only to find that Price's army had already passed over. One of the Union batteries fired a parting salvo across the river and the campaign came to an end.

The same day that Curtis terminated his pursuit of Price the voters of Kansas went to the polls. For awhile the Leavenworth Times, whistling in the political dark, claimed a victory for the anti-Lane Republicans, but it was soon apparent that the regular Republican ticket had won a complete and decisive triumph. Crawford received 13,387 votes and carried 28 of the state's 35 counties. Thacher got only 8,448 votes and lost even in his home county. Lee came much closer to defeating Clarke, losing by only a little over 1,000 votes. Most importantly, nearly all of the new members of the legislature were committed to Lane's re-election as senator. On January 12 a joint session of the legislature, on the first ballot, by a vote of 82 to 16, named Lane to another term in the U.S. senate. Carney was not even nominated.

Although Lane possibly would have been triumphant in any event, owing to Lincoln's backing and his control of the Republican organization, both his adherents and his opponents were of the opinion that the Price raid "made Lane successful." Carney's unwillingness to call out the militia, the foolish statements of the Times, the White Cloud Kansas Chief, Deitzler, and other Carney supporters that Price was not in Missouri, the mutinies and desertions in the militia traceable to these statements, and Carney's probable intention to disband the militia when Price was only a

few miles from the state, all combined to make the governor and his faction appear not only unpatriotic but fatuous. The Lane newspapers did not fail to make the most of these errors by “Carney and his bolting copperhead crew,” and to contrast them unfavorably to the supposedly heroic exploits of Lane and Crawford in repelling Price and saving Kansas. Charges of blatant corruption against Lane by the Carney press had little effect. As one editor expressed it in a post-mortem on the election, if the people of Kansas “cannot have an honest man in the Senate they prefer that the rascal who represents them, should be a man of brains.”

None of the major commanders who participated in the campaign against Price emerged from it with credit. Grant angrily removed Rosecrans and Steele for what he deemed to be their gross incompetence in permitting Price to march clear through Arkansas and Missouri, and he shunted Curtis, who had at least won a nominal victory, off to the Department of the Northwest, with headquarters at Milwaukee, Wis. As for Price, he was being tried by a court of inquiry when the end of the war brought an abrupt termination to its proceedings. His army had been completely shattered, and along with the other Southern forces in the Trans-Mississippi it could only await the coming of spring and the inevitable collapse of the Confederacy. Militarily, the Price raid culminated the Civil War in Kansas and the West.

39. Freedom’s Champion, Atchison, January 19, 1865; Leavenworth Daily Constitution, October 26, 27, November 2-4, 6, 1864; Kansas Weekly Tribune, Lawrence, November 9, 1864.
40. Troy Investigator, quoted in Leavenworth Daily Constitution, November 24, 1864.
42. Ibid., v. 41, pt. 1, pp. 701-729.