farmers. To many, the Roosevelt administration had not achieved a permanent solution. In 1940 government benefit payments in the Plains states were higher than any previous year, and thousands of people remained on the relief rolls. While thousands of Plains farmers had benefitted from government relief programs, the continuance of a vast and costly social welfare program was an anathema to people who still considered themselves independent and self-sufficient.

The letters from the Plains suggest that numerous other factors certainly contributed to the growing disenchantment with the New Deal. For many, the sense of urgency was gone as the depressionary conditions moderated. Also, the shock of the initial confrontation with big government remained. Farmers on the Great Plains had been forced to invite the government into their everyday lives without realizing that it would never again depart. Certainly, much of the frustration resulted from the inability of nationally conceived and administered programs to meet the individual and complex needs of thousands of people. A Wahpeton, N. D., farmer offered a most perceptive comment when he remarked, “I don’t believe that the Lord himself could build a plan to fit a 6 million farm population. . . .” 52 In November, 1940, the Great Plains returned to the Republican fold and rejected the Roosevelt administration. However, the imprint of the depression and the New Deal remained.

52. George Wolf to William Lemke, February 14, 1939, Folder 12, Box 18, "Lemke Papers."
ject to change. People were hired and fired with little or no explanation. Congressmen received hundreds of letters from farmers who had been laid off while neighbors remained on the job. In particular, farmers resented the policy that a person had to have been on relief before he could qualify for WPA work. Farmers pointed out that they had gone to great sacrifice to stay off relief rolls, and when they needed temporary WPA work to get them through the winter, they were denied jobs.

Embittered by rejection and bureaucratic harassment, some farmers reached the conclusion that the WPA catered to an undesirable class of people. A North Dakota farmer complained that “the entire WPA system is honey-combed with relief parasites, women supporting their husbands in idleness, whole families on the staff payroll, and foreigners who are unable even to speak our language. . . .” 48 George Sisson expressed resentment that many Americans worked hard and made it on their own, while others took the easy route and fell back on government relief. He offered a plan to make WPA more effective. Sisson proposed,

We have a vast army of W.P.A. workers and they are famous for doing an insignificant amount of work and collecting big pay for it. We have thousands of R.O.T.C. officers in this country why not put the W.P.A. workers in each town under one of them and see that they do some work for the big checks they get. . . . 49

By 1939 farmers were increasingly sensitive to the “apparent permanence” of New Deal “emergency” programs and the cost of administration. The WPA exemplified this condition. In the words of a North Dakota farmer, “I have no objection to WPA work for those in absolute need but it seems to me there are many that have formed a habit of depending on W.P.A. Also, it seems to me the cost of administering the W.P.A. is too high.” 50 In addition to the cost, the WPA offered no solution for the future. Mrs. Gordon Canfield wrote, “I cannot help but feel that this form of assisting people who, for one reason or another, are unable to find work, leaves a good deal to be desired. No matter how long they work on WPA projects, they are, in the end, just as helpless.” 51

Mrs. Canfield’s observations about the WPA captured the essence of attitudes expressed in the correspondence of Plains

51. Mrs. Gordon Canfield to Francis Case, January 3, 1939, Relief folder, Drawer 30, “Case Papers.”
urged him to bring New Deal programs back in line with the farmers’ needs. He concluded that trade agreements would turn “the Grain Gamblers loose to prey on the American farmer.” Capper’s colleague, Rep. Clifford Hope, also received numerous letters concerning the trade agreements program and many, like J. H. Conard, suggested that if reciprocity had to be continued, it should at least include senate ratification of all treaties.

While much of the correspondence from Plains farmers attacked the trade agreements program specifically, many expressed unhappiness with the New Deal generally and discouragement over the plight of the farmer. John Hanson, after noting his opposition to the reciprocity program, stated that he did not believe “we farmers of the United States are making any headway.” J. E. Dazy remarked that the United States had been “the dumping ground for agricultural products long enough.” He posed the question, “Is it possible that the farmer in this country is the only class of people that cannot get what is coming to them?” One Kansas farmer stated that while he complied with the New Deal farm programs each year, he considered them “fundamentally unsound.” He continued, “As an emergency measure it was at least something, though even a sop. As a permanent set up it is obnoxious in many ways.” In the words of J. H. Conard “Anyway, after seven long years some of the shine is beginning to wear off the New Deal.”

Like segments of the New Deal farm programs, the conduct of various relief programs on the Great Plains became increasingly abrasive as the years passed. In particular, Plains farmers criticized the Works Progress Administration. When the program was initiated in 1935, farmers were not eligible. In the government’s view, farmers might be depressed, but in hard times they could subsist on what they raised. Farmers in need were to be assisted by the Resettlement Administration. Due to the drought in 1936, the government temporarily dropped the exclusion of farmers and allowed them to work on WPA projects if they could meet several requirements. As in the AAA, farmers got caught in a web of bureaucracy. Eligibility rules were numerous, complex, and sub-

42. Edward Anderson to Arthur Capper, December 18, 1939, Agriculture, Reciprocal Trade folder, “Capper Papers.”
43. J. H. Conard to Clifford Hope, February 22, 1940, Trade Agreements folder, Box 94, “Hope Papers.”
44. John Hanson to William Lemke, January 15, 1939, Folder 8, Box 18, “Lemke Papers.”
45. J. E. Dazy to William Lemke, January 10, 1940, Folder 6, Box 18, ibid.
46. Clarence Robb to Arthur Capper, December 25, 1939, Reciprocal Trade, General Correspondence folder, Agricultural box, “Capper Papers.”
47. J. H. Conard to Clifford Hope, February 22, 1940, Trade Agreements folder, Box 94, “Hope Papers.”
braska Sen. George Norris, a consistent supporter of the reciprocal trade agreements program, also received a flood of critical mail. The overwhelming opposition of his constituency prompted him to question the propriety of the agreement. Norris concluded that in view of the “terrible, almost indescribable, condition that affects the Nebraska farmer . . . I am constrained to look with apprehension upon any proposal that will have the effect of reducing the income of these stricken people.”

After extensive hearings and public discussion, the State department announced in January, 1940, that it had suspended negotiations with Argentina. Midwestern congressmen suggested to their constituents that the vociferous and hostile reaction in the Midwest played an important part in the administration’s decision to halt the negotiations. Even though the agreement with Argentina failed to materialize, the proposal had made reciprocity one of the most important political and economic issues on the Great Plains. The proposed treaty had a very unsettling affect and caused farmers to question not only the merits of the trade agreements program but also the sincerity of the administration in general.

The growing concern was reflected by the content and volume of letters which crossed the desks of Midwestern congressmen during and after the public hearings on the Argentine treaty. The office of Senator Capper in particular received considerable correspondence critical of the trade agreements program. Clarence Robb of Niotaze suggested that Sec. of State Cordell Hull, like Pres. William Howard Taft before him, was trading off the American market in order to obtain additional trade outlets for industrial products. Robb admitted that reciprocity was “alright,” but he objected to having my shirt traded off to get a new silk hat for some industrial giant. Of course, if he gets more markets for his products he may employ more men who will in turn eat more of my pork and wheat with some of my beef for Sunday dinner, but what good will that do me if the disparity of prices continues so that I do not get enough back in exchange for my products for me to subsist and pay expenses.

Edward Anderson referred to Capper as the farmers’ friend and


40. American ambassador to Argentina, Norman Armour, agreed that concern for agricultural protection contributed to the break down of negotiations, but he noted other factors such as British trade policy and the outbreak of World War II.—Norman Armour to Cordell Hull, January 29, 1940, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 59, “State Department Central File,” 611.3531/1496.

41. Clarence Robb to Arthur Capper, December 25, 1939, Reciprocal Trade, General Correspondence folder, Agricultural box, “Capper Papers.”
between farmers and the present administration. A general feeling among farmers is that the only policy that is compatible with the agricultural adjustment program is a policy of reserving the home market exclusively for the farmers of this country. \footnote{33}

Wallace admitted that many Midwestern farmers were ready to rebel over the Canadian pact and that the administration had better move to reassure them. \footnote{34}

The Canadian agreements with limited agricultural concessions caused great concern and were viewed by some farmers on the Plains as “dangerous precedent” for future negotiation of trade agreements with agricultural nations. Consequently, the announcement in August, 1939, of intention to negotiate an agreement with Argentina shocked Plains farmers and aroused a storm of protest. In hopes of developing a closer political relationship with Latin America, President Roosevelt had suggested the agreement in March, 1937. At that time, Secretary Wallace opposed the idea and reminded Roosevelt that Argentina was a “red flag” to farmers in the Midwest. \footnote{35} However, two years later in March, 1939, the President informed Wallace that he had directed the State department to initiate secret negotiations with Argentina, and in August the administration made public its intention to seek an agreement with Argentina. \footnote{36} The proposed treaty listed a number of agricultural commodities for possible tariff concessions including livestock, flaxseed, wool, turkeys, corn, and eggs. \footnote{37}

Shortly after the announcement, Midwestern congressmen began to receive a flood of mail from their constituency. Most of the correspondence urged the congressmen to appear at the public hearings and to protest the possible concessions on commodities important to Great Plains agriculture. Rep. William Lemke received a petition from 47 North Dakotans listing a series of objections to the proposed agreement. Noting that the Argentine treaty called for concessions on imports of flax, turkeys and meat products, the petitioners reminded Lemke that “the condition of farmers and livestock producers is such today that they cannot stand further competition from cheap foreign products.” \footnote{38}
farmer also pointed an accusing finger at high tariffs and offered the secretary of agriculture a quota system plan to aid in reduc-
tion of excessive tariff rates.  

Despite considerable support for the reciprocity program, some farmers continued to support protectionist policies. Charles Zirkle urged Senator Capper to oppose the trade agreements program and commented, “American markets must be preserved for American grown products if our farmers are to have permanent prosperity. The protective policy under Republican control made this country the greatest nation in the world, and it is just as necessary to-day.”  

By 1939 the New Deal tariff program had become, as an American Farm Bureau Federation Official News Letter said, “one of the most controversial issues ever debated by farmers.”  

Midwestern congressmen received few letters on reciprocity until the government negotiated several agreements with Canada which included limited concessions to Canadian agriculture. L. W. Babcock, a 71-year-old wheat farmer from Belle Plaine, suggested to Senator Capper that the Canadian trade agreement “was a slap in the face to the stock grower, and to the wheat grower, and indirectly to the corn grower for their refusal to support the New Deal.” In Babcock’s view, the treaty would “enable Canada to unload her surplus cattle and low grade wheat into our markets, which will depress prices for some time to come.”  

The New Deal tariff policy which allowed limited importation of agricultural products appeared to be inconsistent with the crop reduction and limitation policies of the AAA. A troubled farmer from Golden Valley, N. D., wrote Secretary Wallace and complained, “The farmers have all signed the contract to reduce stock and wheat and now we find that Canadian cattle and wheat are being shipped into our markets. If this isn’t stopped after the government spent so much money, everybody will loose [sic] confidence.”  

Clifford Gregory, editor of the Prairie Farmer, warned Wallace that the Canadian treaty threatened to create a rather serious situation in that it tends to create the first definite rift

28. Carl Axelson to Henry Wallace, November 4, 1934, _ibid_.
29. Charles Zirkle to Arthur Capper, February 24, 1937, Agriculture, General Correspondence folder, Box 32, “Capper Papers.”
program and the multitude of guidelines. By the time congress enacted the third farm bill in 1938, many were thoroughly confused. A Kanopolis farmer pleaded with Senator Capper, “If we must have farm legislation for goodness sake give us one we can understand and one that does not give Sec. of Agriculture Wallace power to change the rules and regulations every time the moon changes or oftener.” Several farmers suggested that even the sponsoring congressmen did not understand the law.

Obviously not all Plains farmers reacted negatively to the New Deal farm program. The Roosevelt landslide in the election of 1936 and the hostile reaction to the supreme court decision ending the first AAA indicate that even the critical constituents favored the continuation of the benefit checks concomitant to the program. Many farmers saluted the New Deal for being the first national administration to make a determined effort to intervene on behalf of the distressed farmer. Despite the myriad of regulations, the loss of freedom, and the general feeling that the AAA was not a permanent solution, they believed the movement toward “equality for agriculture” was underway.

No New Deal program generated more comment among farmers on the Great Plains than the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program. Congress in 1934 passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements act which gave the President authority to conclude trade treaties with other nations without congressional approval. Initially, many farmers in the Midwest reacted positively to the proposal out of a belief that previous tariff policies had done little to further the interests of agriculture. The trade agreements system seemed to offer a method to reopen foreign markets which they considered essential to agricultural prosperity.

A number of Midwestern farmers specifically blamed the previous Republican tariffs for the agricultural depression. From his farm in Danbury, Iowa, Ray Mathews attacked the high tariff system in a most illustrative fashion. He informed Secretary Wallace that there “had been a farm problem ever since the first tariff law was enacted.” In Mathew’s mind, the cause for the continuing agricultural depression stuck out like “a carbuncle on the end of a man’s nose” and the remedy was “as plain to be seen as the noonday sun in a cloudless sky.” The cause was the obstruction of trade by high tariff walls.

26. Leonard Hudson to Arthur Capper, December 11, 1938, Agriculture, General Correspondence folder, Box 32. ibid.

certainly holds true in the AAA offices, and returning papers for correction takes time, also prolongs jobs.  

Guidelines for participation in and payments from the AAA prompted the cry of discrimination among farmers on the Great Plains. Congressional correspondence files house hundreds of letters from constituents complaining that the AAA favored the big farmer at the expense of the small man, and furthermore, it actually penalized diversified farmers who had not contributed to the burdensome surpluses of the past.

Under the provisions of the first AAA, wheat allotments were computed on the basis of acreage planted in wheat prior to enactment of the law. Such a provision obviously penalized the farmer who had not planted all his land in wheat. J. A. DeBusk pointed out the inconsistency to his congressman, Clifford Hope. He wrote,

Lots of farmers have done in years past what the Government is paying them to do now. Leaving some of the land out each year. Under the Allotment those who have done this must leave that much out and then the same percent of the remainder of quarter as their neighbor who has not been leaving [sic] any before the Allotment went into effect. . . . Therefore they are getting more benefit from the Allotment than we are and we are helping twice as much as they are in reduction.  

The small farmer with his meager benefit check resented the large payments received by the big operators. A Turon farmer echoed the sentiments of many Plains farmers when he protested, “I don’t think it is fair that the big speculator has so much land to farm and the small farmer has to curtail production until he scarcely has a living left. . . . Why can’t the little fellow on the family sized farm who has no other means of making a living receive a nice benefit payment if he curtails production and let the big speculator work out his own salvation.”  

Mack Stanton was even more graphic in his portrayal of the AAA. He maintained, “These subsidies and penalties go to protect the one-crop farmer. The cotton farmer in the South who exploits the negro, and the lazy wheat farmer who spends a month preparing his soil for wheat and another month harvesting it, and the remaining ten months yammering and whining for help.”

Plains farmers had difficulty understanding the New Deal farm

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Too many people go out there from Washington who obviously don’t know anything about South Dakota, what its like in better times, or its kind of farming. They ask a lot of fool questions, make a lot of silly remarks. It simply infuriates those people! We ought to be awfully careful, I think, whom we send... For God’s sake, if we have them, send people who have a sympathetic attitude and some sense!  

The implementation of the AAA on the Great Plains sparked a number of complaints from farmers. The restrictions placed upon participants in the program raised the cry of “regimentation.” Mrs. W. H. Keller demanded that “the hand of the dictator [be] taken off and this expensive gang of inspectors disbanded. We want no one telling us what and how we shall plant. . . . Better no farm legislation than crop control and its attempt to buy the freedom of the farmer.” Another Kansas farmer wrote that he was “horror stricken at the thought of being forced into the role of a government ward, denied the privilege of using my own judgment.”

A methodical bureaucracy and a morass of confusing regulations and guidelines were natural outgrowths of New Deal programs administered at regional, state, and local levels. Plains farmers, almost totally dependent on relief and benefit checks, were caught in a crossfire of conflicting rules, bookkeeping mistakes, and arbitrary bureaucrats. Midwestern congressmen processed thousands of complaints and requests. Benefit checks for two years past had not arrived. Loan applications had been lost, and it was time to buy seed for planting. Hundreds of letters poured in from tenant farmers questioning the justice of a system that denied them benefit payments because their landlords refused to participate in the AAA.

In a fit of frustration, farmers lashed out at the bureaucracy. A group from Regent, N. D., petitioned Cong. William Lemke. They informed him that,

The farmers of this community gathered last week to see what could be done to get the 1938 AAA payments in time to put in our crops. It seems that there is unnecessary delay in getting these checks out. Many can not get seed loans and we wish to avoid crop mortgages if possible to do so. In spite of bigger office force the payments are much later this year than last year, it seems its purposely delayed to prolong the jobs throughout the year. We complied with this farm program to get this money, even though it has not raised prices. The saying, Humans will err

20. Mrs. W. H. Keller to Arthur Capper, December 6, 1938, Agriculture, General Correspondence folder, Box 32, "Capper Papers."
of this country. You put the farmer on his feet and other industries will soon recover. The Farmers are the back bone of the whole works and the poor devils have had the least consideration of anybody. How long their faith in their country is going to last I don’t know.”

The New Deal moved rapidly to retain the faith of the American farmer. Beginning in early 1933, the Roosevelt administration produced millions of relief dollars and a series of farm programs designed to save the sinking farmers. The introduction and implementation of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and other programs developed to relieve the harried farmer evoked a mixed response. Many Midwestern farmers expressed appreciation for the aggressive programs on behalf of agriculture, but at the same time they questioned various aspects of the programs.

Numerous farmers believed that “eastern theorists” who did not really understand farm conditions formulated the programs, and “real” farmers were not consulted. In a letter to Sen. Peter Norbeck, C. H. Corey complained that, “the farmer had not been listen to.” According to Corey, “Dr. Professor, Dr. Editor, Dr. Busted Banker or what not has been called in consultation. As a consequence, Mr. Farmer is still a mighty sick man and promises to continue so.”

A Minnesota farmer cautioned Rep. Henrik Shipstead not to be “led astray in your reasoning by high-sounding theories or what is apparently proven by means of graphs, charts and statistics. It is the latter method that seems to be solely employed by too many of our supposed saviors at Washington.” Numerous farmers questioned the credibility of farm leaders and organizations. H. L. Austin warned Senator Capper not to “be misled by the so-called farm organizations, as their leaders who are not real dirt farmers at all, but merely theorists, tell them what they should want and the members are just a bunch of yes men.”

Apparently, the conduct of some government field representatives substantiated the impressions held by many Plains farmers. While touring South Dakota in 1936, Lorena Hickok, a field representative for Harry Hopkins, included this comment in her report.


18. H. L. Austin to Arthur Capper, December 9, 1938, Agriculture Correspondence folder, Box 32, “Capper Papers.”
enough. . . . They run the renter off, tear down the buildings so tax will be cheaper, and no upkeep. . . . In other words,” he concluded, “the rich are getting richer and the poor, poorer.” 9

Plains farmers offered their congressmen a myriad of suggestions on how to curb land speculators and “city-farmers.” William Boyce proposed that “farmers like some other citizens be licensed and no license be issued to any person who do not live and engage on general farming.” 10 Another explained that he would “tax the large land owner so high it would not be profitable to own too much land.” He added, “It would be right for all people who have lost their home and farms during this terrible depression to be able to buy them back through the Government.” 11

Letters to Midwestern congressmen relate one story after another of foreclosure or imminent foreclosure. Lars Bue noted that loan agencies had become loan sharks “grasping and nabbing every farm that can be nabbed for the debt against it.” 12 Mrs. D. O. O’Shaughnessy complained, “We have no security left. Foreclosures and evictions at the point of sheriff’s guns, with their drunken scabs, are increasing daily.” 13

With little or no cash income or savings, many farmers were forced to turn to government assistance. Admitting dependence came painfully, and the farmers were quick to reaffirm their industriousness and the temporary nature of their plight. In a letter inquiring about the availability of work relief, William Elliott assured Senator Capper that, “Our people are made out of ‘real stuff’ and have kept a ‘stiff upper lip’ but will have to have enough to live on this winter. . . . It would be [a] tragedy to allow any one who was willing to give an honest day’s labor for something to eat to go hungry.” 14

When corresponding with their congressmen, Plains farmers continually stated that they had been treated as second-class citizens and contended that farm recovery held the key to ending the depression. A letter from J. C. Gerrond is typical. He commented, “There has got to be something done to save the farmers

11. Lewis Moore to Arthur Capper, January 4, 1937, Agriculture, General Correspondence folder, Box 32, ibid.
Evidences of the drought on the Plains in the 1930's. Above, a well near Overbrook from which farmers hauled water for their live stock. Below, the results of wind erosion in western Kansas.

destroying crops and livestock when millions were on the verge of starvation.\textsuperscript{8}

The depression years also witnessed the acceleration of a trend that greatly alarmed many Plains farmers—the decline of the small operator and the appearance of the corporate farmer. Many lashed out at the absentee owners and the “city-farmers” as a major cause for their depressed condition. They complained about doctors and businessmen who sat in “swivel chairs in their offices” and farmed thousands of acres of land with cheap labor and sophisticated machinery. One Kansas farmer viewed the tractor as a threat to the small farmer. He wrote, “The tractor and its machines is nice and I am for them. Used in its place its [sic] betters farm life, but it makes people greedy and they can not get

\textsuperscript{8} R. A. Faden to Arthur Capper, May 24, 1937, Agriculture, General Correspondence folder, Box 32, “Capper Papers.”
Progress Administration and more than $1,200,000,000 in farm benefit checks. The unprecedented activism by the New Deal created a dichotomy for the Plains farmer. He welcomed the much needed assistance, but as an individualist, the farmer resented the resulting loss of freedom. This new relationship accentuated a most humiliating condition—dependence on the government for a future.

Statistical materials provide valuable knowledge concerning the impact of the depression and the New Deal on the farmers of the Great Plains. However, these statistics do not capture the emotional trauma and attitudinal change effected by the depression and the appearance of “big government.” Analysis of letters written by farmers during the period offers valuable additional insight into the material and emotional impact of the above forces. The depression years generated voluminous correspondence between farmers and political figures. In contrast to the 1920’s the files of Midwestern congressmen and state officials serving during the depression are packed with letters from troubled constituents commenting on government programs, weather conditions, personal problems—comments which in their totality portray a graphic picture of depression on the Plains. The testimony of these individuals is an important part of the history of the period.

Anyone reading the correspondence of these people is immediately struck by their dismay about the unusual climatic conditions. Writing to Sen. Arthur Capper, J. W. Lindsey of Coolidge, claimed that western Kansas was in the worst shape that he had witnessed in 51 years. He related, “Four absolute crop failures, one after another, and no rain yet this year... Hogs mostly sold with 9 out of 10 farmers bankrupt and no funds in many cases to provide the necessities of life. Dust storms 3 to 5 days a week. Many people leaving on account of them.” A South Dakota farmer complained that the dust drifted against the fences and allowed livestock to escape. He built another fence on top of the first one, but concluded that the “sand blizzards” would probably necessitate a third. Overwhelmed by a week-old dust storm, one Kansas farmer speculated that the conditions reflected the “wrath of Almighty God” for the “unpardonable sins” of

Depression and New Deal: Letters From the Plains

JAMES B. BEDDOW

During the decade of the 1930’s, the profile of the farmer on the Great Plains experienced dramatic change. The Plains farmer had confronted hard times in the 1920’s, but the seriousness of his plight then was a mere shadow compared to the despair and uncertainty of the great depression. During the 1930’s, the farmer’s trauma included more than just unprecedented economic hardship. He was forced to adjust to a totally new relationship with his government.

Almost all farmers suffered tremendously during the depression, but those on the Plains faced an additional menace—drought. In 1934 and 1936 Plains states broke all records for lack of rainfall. The hot winds and dust storms that rolled across the prairies destroyed crops and feed for livestock, and broke the farmer’s spirit. Farm families went two, three, and four years without a crop. Livestock starved or were sold to the government for a pittance.

Statistical indexes reflecting the condition of the Plains farmer are readily available. Throughout the difficult years after World War I, the total rural population on the Plains remained relatively constant. However, in the 10-year period after the crash more than 455,000 people abandoned their farms. In 1932 the farmer was receiving only 65 cents for products that he sold for $1.00 before the war. At the same time, he was paying $1.10 for goods that cost him $1.00 prior to 1914. In the period 1930-1940, the value of farm property in the region dropped from $17,395,000,000 to $10,540,500,000 or approximately 40 percent.

Massive federal expenditures for relief and farm programs rescued thousands of Plains farmers. The Roosevelt administration poured over $693,000,000 into the region through the Works

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1. In the scope of this article, the term Great Plains refers to the following states: South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas, and Oklahoma.

